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Abstract
Although the financial and budgetary crises of the last few years affect all social
contracts, they particularly threaten the dynamics of gender equality and worsen
the conditions for a work-family balance...
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 T ihis issue of Global Dialogue opens with Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ refl ections on the horrendous killings of the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. If ever there was a series of events that cried out for sociological analysis, then these are they – to consider 
the reason for the killings, the nature of the killers, the impact of cartoons, 
the response of the state, and the support it elicited. What we learn is that 
“freedom of speech” is less a given and more a terrain of contestation and 
the same applies to the meaning of “Muslim” and “terrorist” – one per-
son’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fi ghter. And above all, as Santos 
manages to do so expertly, we have to take a global perspective. We have 
to see the events in the context of regimes of violence and extremism that 
are sweeping the world, much of it perpetrated by nation states and receiv-
ing too little attention. 
   The killings cry out for sociological analysis but sociologists are quiet, 
fearing to set foot on this treacherous terrain, fearing to become public 
sociologists. It can, indeed, be a dangerous business. Wrestling with these 
issues, Nira Yuval-Davis points to two roads to public sociology: one of 
the sociologist in exile who takes up positions from the margins and the 
other of the sociologist – the famous Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling 
– taking on issues from within the Israeli center, but becoming ever more 
critical. Facing a very different set of challenges in Africa, the portrait of 
Issa Shivji reveals an activist scholar, uncompromising in his critique of the 
Tanzanian state and the public defense of university autonomy. 
   Public sociology is not necessarily dangerous, but simply complex and 
urgent. Herbert Docena has been following successive UN Conferences 
on climate change. Watching the dismal negotiations come to naught, he 
focuses on the growing anti-capitalist movements that call for more drastic 
interventions. Finally, important public sociology can be done locally as 
Ariane Hanemaayer and Christopher Schneider demonstrate with their cof-
fee house meetings, which bring the university to publics, and their open 
classrooms, which bring publics to the university. 
   This issue of Global Dialogue also contains three symposia. We have a 
collection of essays on informal urban settlements and land evictions in 
Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, South Africa and Zambia. Despite the overween-
ing violence ranged against inhabitants, protest continues – not sponta-
neous outbursts but politically organized actions, sometimes successful 
but more often not. We also showcase sociology from Indonesia, with fi ve 
essays on the new democratic dispensation that is shaping the legacies of 
religion, education, labor and social mobility. Finally, we have three essays 
from France, focused on new patterns of work – newfangled fabrication 
laboratories, the workplace accommodation of chronic illness, and a pre-
fi guring of the “multi-active society” that dissolves the distinction between 
wage labor, unpaid care work and civic activities.
> Editorial
> Global Dialogue can be found in 15 languages at the
   ISA website
> Submissions should be sent to burawoy@berkeley.edu
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Global Dialogue is made 
possible by a generous grant 
from SAGE Publications.
GD
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, world-
renowned Portuguese sociologist and legal 
scholar, takes a global perspective on the 
assassinations of Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. 
Issa Shivji, long-established and widely-
known leftist critic from Tanzania, is inter-
viewed by one of his students on the role of 
the university in Africa.
Nira Yuval-Davis, distinguished sociologist 
of gender and human rights has an internal 
conversation with famous Israeli sociologist 
Baruch Kimmerling about the different roads 
to public sociology.
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> Charlie Hebdo
Some Tough Quandaries
World leaders march together in a rally held 
in Paris to honor the victims of the Charlie 
Hebdo killings.
by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, University of Coimbra, Portugal and member of the 
Program Committee of the 2014 ISA World Congress
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 The heinous nature of the crime against the journal-ists and cartoonists from Charlie Hebdo makes 
it extremely diffi cult to offer a cool-
headed analysis of what was entailed 
in this barbaric act, its context and 
precedents, as well as its impact and 
future repercussions. Still an analysis 
is urgently needed, lest we fan the 
fl ames of a fi re that one of these days 
may well hit our children’s schools, 
our homes, our institutions and our 
consciences. Here are some thoughts 
towards that analysis. 
> Violence and Democracy 
  One cannot draw a direct connection 
between the Charlie Hebdo tragedy 
and the fi ght against terrorism waged 
by the US and its allies since Sep-
tember 11, 2001. It is a known fact, 
however, that the West’s extreme ag-
gressiveness has caused the death of 
many thousands of innocent civilians 
(mostly Muslims) and infl icted as-
tounding levels of violence and torture 
on young Muslims against whom all 
suspicions of wrongdoing are specu-
lative at best, as attested to by the 
report recently submitted to the US 
Congress. It is also well known that 
many young Islamic radicals claim 
that their radicalization stems from 
their anger at all that unredressed vi-
olence. In view of this, we must stop 
and consider whether the best way to 
bring the spiral of violence to a halt is 
to pursue the same policies that have 
driven it so far, as has now become all 
too evident. The French response to 
the attack was to suspend democrat-
ic, constitutional normalcy with an 
undeclared state of siege. It assumed 
that this type of criminal should be 
shot dead rather than incarcerated 
and brought to justice, and that such 
behavior in no way seems to contra-
dict Western values. We have entered 
a phase of low-intensity civil war. Who 
in Europe stands to gain from it? Cer-
tainly not the Podemos party in Spain, 
nor Greece’s Syriza.
> Freedom of Expression
   The freedom to express oneself is a 
precious commodity, but it, too, has 
its limits, and the truth is that the 
overwhelming majority of those limits 
are imposed by those who advocate 
limitless freedom whenever their own 
freedom is curtailed. The examples 
of such limits are legion: in England 
a demonstrator can get herself ar-
rested for saying that David Cameron 
has blood on his hands; in France Is-
lamic women are not allowed to wear 
the hijab; in 2008, cartoonist Siné 
(Maurice Sinet) was fi red from Char-
lie Hebdo for writing an allegedly anti-
Semitic article. What this all means is 
that limits do exist, it’s just that they 
vary for different interest groups. Take 
Latin America, for example, where the 
major media, which are controlled by 
oligarchic families and big capital, are 
the fi rst to cry out for unrestrained 
freedom of expression so that they 
can throw abuse at the progressive 
governments and silence all the good 
that these governments have done to 
promote the well-being of the poor. It 
seems that Charlie Hebdo knew no 
limits when it came to caricaturing 
Muslims, although many of its car-
toons could be read as racist prop-
aganda feeding the Islamophobic, 
anti-immigrant wave now sweeping 
over France and Europe in general. 
Besides many cartoons in which the 
Prophet is shown in indecent poses, 
one in particular was very much ex-
plored by the far right. It depicted a 
group of pregnant Muslim women 
presented as Boko Haram sex slaves, 
their hands resting on their swollen 
bellies, screaming “Hands off our 
welfare benefi ts.” At one stroke, the 
cartoon stigmatized Islam, women 
and the welfare state. As was to be 
expected, over the years the largest 
Muslim community in Europe saw 
this editorial line as offensive. On the 
other hand, however, its condemna-
tion of the barbaric crime in Paris was 
immediate. We must therefore re-
fl ect on the contradictions and asym-
metries of the lived values some of us 
believe to be universal. 
> Tolerance and “Western 
values”
   As academe’s bureaucratic regula-
tion intensifi es, new perThe context of 
the crime is dominated by two cur-
rents of opinion, none of which is 
conducive to building an inclusive, 
intercultural Europe. The more radical 
of the two is openly Islamophobic and 
anti-immigrant. These are the hard-
liners of the far right all across Eu-
rope and of the right wherever it feels 
threatened in upcoming elections (as 
was the case of Greece’s Antonis Sa-
maras). For this current of thought, 
the enemies of European civilization 
are among “us” – they hate us, they 
wield our passports, and the situa-
tion cannot be solved unless they are 
eliminated. The anti-immigrant over-
tones are unmistakable. The other 
current is that of tolerance. These 
people are very different from us, they 
are a burden, but we have to “put up 
with them,” for, if nothing else, they 
are useful; we should do it, however, 
only if they behave moderately and 
assimilate our values. 
   But what are “Western values”? Af-
ter many centuries of atrocities com-
mitted in the name of such values 
both within and outside Europe – from 
colonial violence to the two world 
wars – a degree of caution and much 
refl ection are in order about what 
those values are and also about why, 
depending on the context, now some 
of them, now others, tend to take 
precedence. For example, no one 
questions the value of freedom, but 
the same cannot be said for equality 
and fraternity, the two values underly-
ing the welfare state that prevailed in 
democratic Europe after World War II. 
In recent years, however, social pro-
tection – which used to ensure high 
levels of social integration – began to 
be questioned by conservative poli-
ticians and is now seen as an unaf-
fordable luxury by governing parties 
whether they be center-left or center-
right. Isn’t it true that the social cri-
sis caused by the erosion of social 
protection and by growing unemploy-
ment, especially among youth, is like 
fuel to the fl ames of radicalism found 
among the younger generations, es-
pecially those who, in addition to un-
employment, are the victims of ethnic 
and religious discrimination? 
> A Clash of Fanaticisms, Not 
of Civilizations
   What we are facing now is not a 
clash of civilizations, because Chris-
tian and Islamic civilizations share 
the same roots. What we have before 
us is a clash of fanaticisms, even if 
some of them are just too close to 
us to be recognized as such. History 
shows that fanaticisms and the way 
in which they clash have always been 
related to the economic and politi-
cal interests of the elites. They have 
never been benefi cial to the popular 
classes, which always bear the brunt 
of such clashes as foot soldiers. This 
is the case, in Europe and its areas 
of infl uence, of the Crusades and the 
Inquisition, the evangelization of co-
lonial populations, the religious wars 
and the confl ict in Northern Ireland. 
Outside Europe, a religion as peace-
able as Buddhism has legitimated 
the slaughter of many thousands of 
members of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minor-
ity; in 2003, Hindu fundamentalists 
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also slaughtered the Muslim popula-
tions of Gujarat, and the likelihood of 
their rise to power as a result of Presi-
dent Modi’s recent victory makes one 
fear the worst; it is also in the name 
of religion that Israel is carrying on 
with its unpunished, ethnic cleansing 
of Palestine and that the so-called 
Islamic Emirate is slaughtering Mus-
lim populations in Syria and in Iraq. 
Could it be that the defense of unre-
strained secularism in an intercultural 
Europe, where many people do not 
identify with this particular value, is it-
self a form of extremism? Do extrem-
isms oppose one another? Do they 
interconnect? What relationships are 
there between the jihadists and the 
Western secret services? How come 
the jihadists of the Islamic Emirate, 
who are now seen as terrorists, used 
to be freedom fi ghters when they 
were fi ghting against Gaddafi  and As-
sad? How is it that the Islamic Emir-
ate is funded by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait and Turkey, all of them allies 
of the West? This being said, the fact 
remains that, over the last decade, 
at least, the overwhelming majority 
of victims of all fanaticisms (including 
Islamic fanaticism) belonged to non-
fanatical Muslim populations.
> The Value of Human Life 
   The absolute, unconditional revul-
sion experienced by Europeans in the 
face of these deaths should make 
us wonder why they do not feel the 
same kind of revulsion in the face of a 
similar, if not much higher, number of 
innocent deaths caused by confl icts 
that, at bottom, may have some-
thing to do with the Charlie Hebdo 
tragedy. On that very same day, 37 
young people were killed in a bomb 
attack in Yemen. Last summer, the 
Israeli invasion caused the death of 
2,000 Palestinians, among them 
1,500 civilians and 500 children. In 
Mexico, 102 journalists have been 
murdered since 2000 for speaking 
up for freedom of the press, and in 
November 2014, 43 young protes-
tors were killed in Ayotzinapa, also in 
Mexico. Surely the difference in those 
reactions cannot be based on the no-
tion that the life of white Europeans, 
coming from a Christian culture, is 
worth more than the lives of non-Eu-
ropeans or of Europeans of another 
color, whose culture originates in dif-
ferent religions or in other regions. Is 
it because the latter live at a remove 
from the Europeans and are less fa-
miliar to them? On the other hand, 
does the Christian injunction to love 
one’s neighbor provide for such dis-
tinctions? Is it because the big media 
and the political leaders in the West 
tend to trivialize the suffering infl icted 
on those others, or even to demonize 
them to the point of making us think 
that they had it coming?
Direct all correspondence to Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos <bsantos@ces.uc.pt>
> Two Roads to 
   Public Sociology
by Nira Yuval-Davis, University of East London, UK, President of ISA Research Committee 
on Racism, Nationalism and Ethnic Relations (RC05), 2002-6 and member of the Program 
Committee for ISA World Congress in Durban, 2006
>>
 B aruch Kimmerling, who suffered all his life from cerebral palsy and arrived in Israel as a refugee from Romania after 1948, was one of Israel’s most important and best known sociologists, 
not least because of his frequent contributions to the Is-
raeli press.
   Baruch and I were friends since we were undergraduates 
together at the Hebrew University, where Baruch remained 
throughout his life; I left after completing my MA in 1969, 
fi rst to the USA and then to the UK. As research students 
we both rebelled against Shmuel Eisenstadt (who domi-
nated Israeli sociology for nearly 40 years), but we differed 
in our sociological approaches and for many years also 
politically. In my twenties, I was radicalized to non- and 
then anti-Zionist analyses of Israeli state and society; after 
many more years and a systematic study of the Israeli-
Palestinian confl ict and societies, Baruch reached similar 
conclusions – although he continued to label himself a 
Zionist. He developed important aspects of this fi eld of so-
ciology, while I “branched off” into what might be summed 
up as intersectional politics of belonging.
   When Baruch died in 2007, as one of the Israeli, Pal-
estinian and international social scientists invited to give 
papers at a memorial conference, I spoke on the existen-
tial anxiety of Israelis – especially those Baruch called “the 
Akhusalim,” the Ashkenazi, Secular and Labor Zionists who 
were hegemonic in the Zionist movement for most of the 
20th century. I related this existential anxiety to several en-
demic factors, some common to all hegemonic minorities 
in settler colonial projects; others common to “neo-liberal 
risk societies”; and others more specifi c to Israel, relat-
ing to its character as a permanent war society as well as 
to the rising messianic fundamentalist Jewishness which 
threatens to undermine Israel’s quasi-secular regime. 
   To my astonishment, what I said was generally positively 
received – very differently to the way my analysis had been 
received in the past. (However, although the radical mes-
sages delivered by speakers were not challenged at the con-
ference, the volume of our papers has still not been pub-
 7
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Nira Yuval-Davis, an Israeli dissident, has been 
a long-standing defender of human rights: a 
founder member of Women Against Fundamen-
talism, and the international research network 
of Women in Militarized Confl ict Zones, a con-
sultant to different divisions of the United Na-
tions as well as to various NGOs, including Am-
nesty International. Known internationally for 
her research on gender, racism, and religious 
fundamentalism, her books include Racialized 
Boundaries, Gender and Nation, The Politics of 
Belonging, Women against Fundamentalism. 
She is Director of the Research Centre on Migra-
tion, Refugees and Belonging at the University 
of East London. In this essay she conducts an 
internal conversation with the renowned Israeli 
sociologist, now deceased, Baruch Kimmerling, 
on the different roads to public sociology. 
lished, fi ve years later, apparently because of resistance at 
the Van Lear Institute which hosted the conference.)
   I would like to especially recommend Baruch’s autobiog-
raphy1, which is written with his usual wit and intellectual 
honesty, and which will also add to readers’ understanding 
of the Israeli/Palestinian confl ict. However, it raises some 
important questions in relation to public sociology. I limit 
myself here to two main questions.
> Public and Professional Sociology
   Baruch argues that he completely separated his public 
journalistic and professional academic work, a differentia-
tion which fl ows from his Weberian belief in what Donna 
Haraway called “God’s trick of seeing everything from no-
where.” By contrast, I have argued for situated knowledge 
and situated imagination, following most feminist theorists 
and other radical traditions in the sociology of knowledge, 
Marxist and anti-racist. Rather than a relativist position – 
which insists that there are many truths that need to be 
judged on their own merits and therefore cannot be com-
pared – I argue that one’s own standpoints (which include 
social locations, identifi cations and normative values sys-
tems, irreducible to each other but mediated by one’s life 
experiences and practices, fl uid and contested as they are 
within particular structural and processual constraints) af-
fect the ways one sees the world. Knowledge of “truth” can 
only be approximated by a dialogical constructive process, 
in which many situated gazes take part within particular 
spatial and temporal contexts.
   My problem with Baruch’s dichotomy between the po-
litical and the professional is not just epistemological. 
Throughout my years as a sociologist and a political activ-
ist, I have found that the two modes of action nurture and 
provide critical insights for each other – with grassroots 
political activism helping to acquire empathetic under-
standing of other situated gazes on the one hand, and 
theoretical and empirical scholarship helping to refi ne and 
challenge some crude dichotomies of identity politics on 
the other hand. Moreover, often the line between the two 
seems artifi cial, when we consider why particular research-
ers embark on particular research projects and how they 
disseminate their research fi ndings. 
   Baruch’s public interventions display the same pat-
tern of overlapping preoccupations and mutual insights, 
starting from the moment he decided to study the Israeli-
Palestinian confl ict, after the 1969 cafeteria bombing on 
his university campus. I greatly doubt Baruch’s claim that 
he relied less on intuition in his “scientifi c” work than in 
his political work. As Baruch himself notes in relation to 
Kuhn’s theory of paradigmatic change, all data collection 
involves elements of selectivity. Nonetheless, I empathize 
with his frustration that people judged his sociological work 
only after reading his short public articles.
    Baruch’s shifting paradigms of knowledge and his under-
standing of Israeli and Palestinian societies, however, raise 
a second issue, related to Baruch’s claim that his position 
as “a marginal at the center” was a precondition as well as 
the mode of his public sociology.
> The Role of Social Location 
   in Public Sociology
   In his thorough, refl ective, honest way, Baruch describes 
his fi rst article in Israel’s oldest newspaper Ha’aretz, as a 
thorough and extreme attack on Sabri Jiris’ book The Ar-
abs in Israel. Much later, Baruch realized not only that Sabri 
had been right, but that, having no access to archival mate-
rial, Sabri underestimated the scale and deviousness of the 
means by which Israeli Palestinians had been controlled and 
their lands confi scated. Baruch acknowledges a similar shift 
regarding Ian Lustick’s book, Arabs in the Jewish State which 
he later justly praises highly. (Although he doesn’t mention 
it in his autobiography, when my co-edited book Israel and 
the Palestinians was published in 1975, he wrote to me as 
a concerned friend, recommending that I avoid including it 
on my CV. Many of the articles, including mine, correspond 
quite closely to Baruch’s later writings.)
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Baruch Kimmerling, 
was born in 1939 to a 
Hungarian mother and 
a Romanian father. Af-
ter escaping the Holo-
caust, Baruch’s fam-
ily immigrated to Israel 
where he grew up. He 
studied sociology at 
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where he 
researched and taught most of his adult life. 
After the bombing of its cafeteria in 1969, he 
turned to study the roots, history and actuali-
ties of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, develop-
ing an approach at odds with the offi cial Israeli 
narrative. As an outspoken critic of Israeli poli-
cies he was subject to wide and harsh recrimi-
nation. Through his writings and teaching he 
tried to infl uence Israeli public opinion in favor 
of a genuine democratic state that accepts all of 
its citizens without discrimination, renounces 
military aggressiveness and strives for peace 
through compromise and humanitarian ap-
proaches. Baruch Kimmerling died in 2007, 
faithful to his values and ideas, and very wor-
ried for Israel’s future. His books include Zion-
ism and Territory: The Socioterritorial Dimen-
sions of Zionist Politics (1983), The Invention 
and Decline of Israeliness: State, Culture and 
Military in Israel (2001); Politicide: Sharon’s 
War Against the Palestinians (2003).
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   Over the years, Baruch was able to reassess his un-
derstanding of the Israeli and Palestinian societies and 
confl icts; he became a wonderful public sociologist, whose 
writing infl uenced wider Israeli opinion in important ways. 
My understanding of various issues has also grown and 
changed throughout the years; I hope that like Baruch, this 
will continue till the day I die. However, I would like to take 
issue with two of Baruch’s claims.
   Firstly, Baruch suggests that he developed his new per-
spective and understanding on his own, with little infl uence 
from the work of others whose works he’d read and with 
some of whom, over the years, he had spent many hours 
debating. This non-dialogical construction of self and of 
knowledge seems to misrepresent the process of knowl-
edge and attitude acquisition. Ironically, it undermines the 
raison d’être of public sociology, which aims to present 
alternative analyses and presentation of facts.
   Secondly, Baruch argues that he was able to become 
a public sociologist because, unlike the rest of us at the 
margin, he was trusted as “one of us.” In other words, he 
was “legitimate” in the eyes of the elites. Baruch suggests 
that this enabled him to be published in the mainstream 
Israeli press (which is indisputable), while others with a 
similar analysis (e.g. the members of the radical socialist 
and anti-Zionist organization, Matzpen) were less visible 
in the public arena because their views were considered 
illegitimate. This legitimacy, he suggests, is a precondition 
for effective work as a public sociologist. 
   Baruch suggests that his contingent acceptance as “one 
of them” stemmed in part from his attacks on books like 
those of Jiris and Lustick – the repudiation of analyses that 
he later came to respect. But this view leaves us with a 
major theoretical, as well as political, conundrum: must 
one “prove” oneself a trusted member of the collectivity, 
before one can accumulate the social capital required to 
be effective? What if that process of accumulation involves 
initially undermining the very cause for which one later be-
comes an advocate?2 
   There is no easy answer to this question. Given the 
state of contemporary Israeli society and politics – as well 
as other parts of the region and the world as a whole – I 
often feel close to despair, even though I try to cling to 
Gramsci’s politics of hope, optimism of the will and pes-
simism of the intellect. Although Baruch started from the 
center, rather than the margins, he came to feel similarly 
frustrated and depressed. I would love to hear from other 
readers of Global Dialogue about where they feel public 
sociologists, and other public intellectuals, must locate 
themselves in order to be effective.
Direct all correspondence to Nira Yuval-Davis <n.yuval-davis@uel.ac.uk>
1 Kimmerling B. (2013) Marginal at the Centre: The Life Story of a Public Sociologist. 
New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, translated by Diana Kimmerling. 
2 The strategy of many of us in the “illegitimate” margins has been, on the one hand, 
to work as public activists in a variety of specifi c (often unpopular) campaigns in Israel, 
as well as to establish dialogues and solidarity with Palestinians and Arabs with similar 
values and, on the other hand, also work with socialists and human rights defend-
ers outside Israel and the Middle East in order to infl uence international public and 
governmental support of Israel. 
>>
> A Life of Critical 
   Engagement
Issa Shivji.
 I ssa Shivji is one of the great public intellectuals of postcolonial Africa. He was a law student (1967-1970) at the University of Dar es Salaam, grow-ing up amidst distinguished leftist scholars such as 
sociologists Giovanni Arrighi, Immanuel Wallerstein and 
John Saul. These scholars came from all over the world, 
attracted to the formative intellectual ferment at the uni-
versity. Even as a precocious student, Shivji began to chal-
lenge the socialist policies of the Ujamaa regime of Julius 
Nyerere, the fi rst President of Tanzania. During this early 
period he wrote such celebrated and widely-debated works 
as The Silent Class Struggle that drew attention to the 
social forces that were politically (un)represented in the 
new postcolonies of Africa. After receiving degrees from 
the London School of Economics and the University of Dar 
es Salaam, he took up a post in the Faculty of Law which 
he never left until retiring in 2006. During that time he 
became a public fi gure devoted to land reform and con-
stitutional law. He survived political turbulence despite his 
outspoken commentaries on the turn to neoliberalism in 
the 1980s as well as the corporatization of the university. 
In 2008 he was awarded the Julius Nyerere Chair in Pan-
African Studies with the express purpose of restoring the 
university as a center of public debate. Professor Shivji 
has inspired many younger academics, such as the politi-
cal science lecturer, Sabatho Nyamsenda, who conducted 
this interview. He was also an active participant in the ISA’s 
World Congress in Durban, South Africa (2006).
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An Interview with Issa Shivji 
SN: Your association with the University of Dar es 
Salaam (also known as Mlimani, or the Hill) started 
in 1967 as a law student, and after graduating you 
joined the law faculty at the same university – a posi-
tion that you held for 36 years. Why did you decide to 
remain at the University while most of your progres-
sive colleagues joined other institutions? 
IS: True, many of my comrades joined other institutions 
including the National Service Offi ce, the Party and even 
the army. In hindsight, it may sound a bit naïve, but the 
truth is that it was a collective decision of comrades as to 
who would be most effective where. Comrades thought, 
and I agreed, that I should remain at the University to do 
progressive intellectual and ideological work. 
The University did provide relative space for progressive 
ideas to fl ourish, a terrain where progressive intellectual 
camaraderie could be created and sustained. At the time, 
the overall nationalist commitment combined with the 
deeper intellectual understanding of the imperialist system 
helped to cultivate radical young scholars, many of whom 
ended up as teachers in secondary schools thus further 
fertilizing progressive thought and practice. 
I have never regretted spending the whole of my working 
life at the Hill.
SN: In your Accumulation in an African Periphery you 
divide the post-colonial experience of African coun-
tries, and Tanzania in particular, into three phases: 
the nationalist phase (1960s and 1970s), the critical 
phase (1980s) and the neoliberal phase (1990s to 
the present). How did these changes affect Mlimani? 
IS: Universities exist in a social environment and they are 
obviously affected by changes in that environment. The 
decade of the eighties was an extremely critical period for 
our country as, indeed, it was for the rest of Africa. Uni-
versities were starved of resources while at the same time 
being exposed to an incessant ideological and intellectual 
onslaught of neo-liberal prescriptions. Many of our col-
leagues left for universities in Southern Africa – Lesotho, 
Botswana, Swaziland and later South Africa and Namibia. 
But some stuck it out, including many young radical schol-
ars who had imbibed progressive ideas during the fi rst two 
decades of revolutionary nationalist fervor. They continued 
to do some very good work. For example, they led the intel-
lectual side of the “great” constitutional debate in 1983-4 
articulating anti-authoritarian and anti-statist positions. Of 
course, there were different tendencies, those seeing lib-
eral democracy, human rights, multi-party as the ultimate 
goal and therefore demanding essentially reformist reforms. 
Then a minority tendency saw the struggle for democracy 
as a school for independent class actions; they called for 
revolutionary reforms. To give one example: The reformists 
would demand immediate institution of the multi-party sys-
tem while revolutionaries would demand, fi rst, a separation 
of the party and the state, and second, a protracted national 
debate taking stock of the post-independence period and 
chart out and build a new national consensus. 
In the transition from the nationalist to the neo-liberal pe-
riod, the Hill was still a hotbed of debates and ideological 
struggles. These fi zzled out during the third phase govern-
ment as neo-liberalism consolidated itself in the country 
and vocationalization and corporatization of the University 
gained momentum.
SN: In 2008, you were appointed the fi rst incumbent 
of the Mwalimu Nyerere Professorial Chair in Pan-Afri-
can Studies, known as Kigoda in Kiswahili. Soon after 
you were installed, you were quoted saying it was “an 
honor” for you “to keep Nyerere’s legacy alive.” Which 
legacy were you referring to, given the fact that the 
Nyerere you describe in your writings is vehemently 
opposed to Marxism and struggles from below? 
IS: Nyerere was a radical nationalist. He was a progres-
sive Pan-Africanist and broadly anti-imperialist. To be sure, 
his anti-imperialism was not grounded in radical political 
economy, as was Nkrumah’s. Yet, his pro-people stance 
was consistent; his anti-imperialist position supportable 
and his nationalism progressive. 
In comparison to the neo-liberal political class that suc-
ceeded him, and mindful of the havoc that this class has 
created in our society, woe unto any progressive, even a 
Marxist, who wouldn’t want to recall Nyerere’s legacy and 
deploy it as an ideological resource in the struggle against 
the current rapacious phase of capitalism. 
Nyerere was not a Marxist and he didn’t disguise himself 
as one. Marx himself when confronted with vulgar Marxism 
exclaimed: “I am not a Marxist!”
As a head of state, it is true he came out against struggles 
from below. But does that mean that a progressive per-
son should not celebrate Nyerere’s progressive legacy and 
draw lessons from its contradictory character? My friend, a 
Marxist is not a purist; s/he is political!
SN: What do you mean by the “contradictory charac-
ter” of Nyerere’s legacy?
IS: I can do no better than give an anecdote about Mwal-
imu himself. A few months after he had thrown out stu-
dents from the Hill for demonstrating against the state 
in 1978, he visited the campus. One student was coura-
geous enough to ask him something to the effect: “Mwal-
imu, you talk about democracy but when we demonstrated 
in the interest of democracy you sent the FFU [Field Force 
Unit] to beat us up!” 
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Mwalimu stared at him, and then replied: “What did you 
expect? I am head of state; I preside over the institution 
which wields the monopoly of violence. If you cause chaos 
in the streets, of course I’d send in the FFU. But does that 
mean you shouldn’t fi ght for democracy? Democracy is 
never given on a silver platter!” [not his exact words]
And we all clapped. Mwalimu could have his cake and eat it!
SN: The Iranian revolutionary intellectual Ali Shariati 
once dubbed universities “invincible fortifi ed fortress-
es,” whose main task is to produce intellectual slaves 
for the corporate world. Did the Kigoda, the Pan-Afri-
can Studies Program, manage to open the gates of the 
Mlimani “fortress,” and link its intellectuals with the 
masses? If yes, how?
IS: It would be foolish for me to claim that Kigoda managed 
to open the gates of the university “fortress.” In Althusse-
rian terms, universities are part of the ideological state ap-
paratus. The dominant intellectuals there are undoubtedly 
producers and conveyors of dominant knowledge, which 
forms the basis of dominant ideologies. 
But by the very nature of the process of production of 
knowledge, there is bound to be a clash of ideas. This al-
lows some space for outlooks other than dominant ones. 
Nonetheless, such spaces should not be taken for grant-
ed. They have their limits and, in critical times, even those 
spaces are suppressed. It is a struggle to claim and re-
claim on a continuous basis those progressive spaces. And 
like all struggles, these intellectual struggles also require 
imagination as to their forms and methods. 
This is all that Kigoda attempted to do; nothing more. Per-
haps it managed to cause some intellectual fervor; per-
haps it managed to gain some credibility with young intel-
lectuals and the people; perhaps it managed to excavate 
progressive archives of the Hill. Even that had limits, and 
those limits began to show towards the end of my term. 
One can only do so much within the given circumstances. I 
think it was E.H. Carr, following Plekhanov and before him 
Marx, who said that while individuals make history, they do 
not choose the circumstances in which they do so. 
SN: Nyerere once warned the oppressed against using 
money as their weapon. Yet, funding seems to have 
become central to intellectual projects nowadays. No 
work is done without money. Even the most progres-
sive organizations have found it inevitable to kneel be-
fore the capitalist agencies in search of money. How 
did Kigoda run its activities?
IS: Yes, money, and donor money at that, has become 
the motor driving intellectual projects. Kigoda undoubt-
edly faced the problem of funding, but it established cer-
tain principles right at the outset. First, all administrative 
expenses, including the salaries of the Chair and his as-
sistant, would come from the regular University budget. 
Second, Kigoda would avoid taking money from foreign 
donors. Third, whatever funding is given by domestic pub-
lic institutions or friendly African intellectual organizations 
should be without strings attached. And, fi nally, the agen-
da and the activities of Kigoda would be set strictly by the 
Kigoda collective.
It was not easy but by keeping our budget modest, relying 
heavily on voluntary work and spending with a lot of pru-
dence, we managed. 
SN: Now that you have retired from the university, what 
are the projects you are planning to undertake? 
IS: While still at the University, with two colleagues, Professor 
Saida Yahya-Othman and Dr. Ng’wanza Kamata, I embarked 
on the project to write a defi nitive biography of Mwalimu 
Nyerere supported by the Tanzania Commission for Science 
and Technology. We have now more or less completed our 
research – if you can ever complete a research of this kind 
– and have now started the process of writing. 
One of the important outcomes of that project is the estab-
lishment of the Nyerere Resource Centre (NRC). The Centre 
will have a documentation room where all the material we 
collected will be stored and made available to researchers. 
Around the Centre we will organize activities with a view to 
providing a platform for strategic thinking, debates and dis-
cussions. We hope to begin activities this year. It is my hope 
that NRC will become a hub for refl ecting on many burning 
issues facing the country and the continent. 
I feel that the neo-liberal, NGOism and consultancy cul-
ture with their emphasis on policy – more “action,” little 
thought – and prescriptive prognosis has taken a toll on 
our intellectual thinking, the result of which is that we have 
abdicated analyzing and understanding the world. We can-
not fi ght for a better world without understanding the world 
better. For that, we need to take a longer view of history. 
Hopefully, the Centre will contribute towards reviving the 
culture of holistic, long-term thinking. 
Direct all correspondence to Sabatho Nyamsenda <sany7th@yahoo.com> 
and Issa Shivji <issashivji@gmail.com>
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> Capitalism vs. 
   Climate Justice
by Herbert Docena, University of California, Berkeley, USA and member of the ISA Research 
Committee on Labor Movements (RC44)
The People’s March to Defend Mother Natu-
re during the UN climate change summit in 
Lima, led by social movements from around 
the world demanding “Change the System 
not the Climate.” Photo by Herbert Docena. 
 A s has become traditional since 1972, when the fi rst UN conference on the environment was 
held in Stockholm, thousands of peo-
ple from around the world once again 
gathered for an alternative “People’s 
Summit” in December (2014). They 
marched on the streets of Lima (Peru) 
while hundreds of state representa-
tives met inside a military camp for 
the latest Conference of Parties (COP) 
of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. 
   The calls from the “People’s Sum-
mit” varied as usual. Some waved 
colorful placards saying, “We call for 
a serious climate change law!” or “No 
more speeches, act!” – demands 
which suggest that there is or could be 
a harmony of interests between those 
marching and those meeting at the of-
fi cial conference some fourteen kilom-
eters away, and that the latter could 
really pass a “serious climate change 
law” under the existing system.
   But the more common demand I 
heard – indeed, the call expressed on 
the central banner behind which all 
marched – was “Change the System 
not the Climate!,” along with varia-
tions, such as “Save the planet from 
capitalism!,” and other such state-
ments as “Capitalists: Murderers!” or 
“COP: Nest of Predators” – demands 
which imply that there is a funda-
mental antagonism between those 
making the demands and those be-
ing addressed, and that those being 
addressed are incapable of “saving 
the planet” under the existing system.
   This call for “system-change” has 
been voiced in an increasing number 
of places across the world in recent 
years: in the 400,000-strong march in 
New York last September, in the smaller 
demonstration in Warsaw at the 2013 
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UN summit, in the unprecedented 
world social movements’ conference 
on climate change in Cochabamba in 
2010, in the Copenhagen summit last 
2009 – and even inside the UN sum-
mit by Bolivia’s self-professed socialist 
President Evo Morales. 
   Its importance in Lima was, in part, 
a refl ection of the heightened level 
of militancy on the continent where 
this year’s UN conference was held. 
But its growing resonance beyond 
Lima could also be a signal of a wider 
shift in people’s consciousness and 
identities worldwide and, with it, of a 
deeper shift in the broader balance of 
social forces around the global eco-
logical crisis. It indicates the growing 
inability of the world’s dominant bloc 
to exercise one of their most potent 
powers: the ability to set the terms 
and the language of the debate by 
shaping how people view the world 
and categorize themselves. 
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   After all, since at least the 1970s, 
different groups of state offi cials, cor-
porate executives, and other intel-
lectuals have been actively working 
– in different, sometimes compet-
ing ways – to make any demand to 
change the system unthinkable and 
un-expressible. They have tried to do 
this by elaborating and propagating 
worldviews or ideologies which repre-
sent the world’s ruling groups as the 
“saviors” of the planet whose inter-
ests are in fundamental harmony with 
“the people,” and who are capable of 
solving the crisis within capitalism. 
   Suddenly confronted with an unex-
pected upsurge of radical environmen-
talist movements that began blaming 
capitalism for global environmental 
problems and that in effect questioned 
their hegemony or their claim to pro-
mote universal interests, they have 
been forced to engage in a kind of 
struggle often missed by analysts of so-
called “global environmental change”: 
the struggle over how to represent and 
make sense of this “change.”
   Through the knowledge-production 
apparatuses of the OECD, the World 
Bank, the UN, and a constellation 
of NGOs and other organizations of 
global civil society, they would set 
out over the next two decades to try 
to counter, absorb and defl ect radi-
cal environmentalist critiques by de-
veloping and diffusing discourses 
such as “sustainable development” 
or “ecological modernization” which 
blame the ecological crisis on “mar-
ket failure,” on “vested interests,” or 
on just the fossil fuel industry – never 
the entire system – and that portray 
capital as benevolent, responsible 
“partners.” Through everyday, institu-
tionalized practices – from the ways 
they calculate emissions by countries 
instead of by class to the ways they 
entice rather than punish polluters – 
they have sought to instill in people 
a common view: that the problem is 
not the system and the enemy is not 
capital. 
  In short, global elites have been 
working to shape global culture or to 
mold people’s “common sense” so 
as to counter the ideas introduced 
by radical movements and defuse the 
antagonisms they kindled. And to a 
great extent, they succeeded. The 
once-powerful radical movements 
that for a time shook capitalist he-
gemony were pushed to the margins 
starting in the 70s and 80s. Those 
who demanded “system-change” 
were successfully cast as rabid ex-
tremists. Indeed, it became easier to 
imagine apocalypse than to imagine 
“system-change.”
   However, in Lima and across the 
world, an increasing number of peo-
ple – including best-selling author 
Naomi Klein, Pope Francis, and other 
infl uential fi gures – are now again ex-
plicitly linking capitalism to climate 
change, categorizing capitalists as 
ruthless “predators” and imagining 
“systemic alternatives.” All this indi-
cates that the hegemons did not en-
tirely succeed in preventing a radical, 
global counter-hegemonic movement 
from re-emerging. 
   So far, however, as the outcome of 
the UN conference in Lima shows, this 
movement is still not powerful enough 
to prevent the world’s dominant 
groups from advancing their preferred 
“solution” to the ecological crisis.
   For even as they deny that the crisis 
is intrinsically rooted in the system – 
and even as less far-sighted offi cials 
and business executives deny that 
there is a crisis and oppose even the 
weakest reforms – capitalism’s van-
guards try to manage the global econ-
omy from their vantage points in the 
OECD, the World Bank, the universi-
ties, policy planning departments, 
etc. Such leaders have actually taken 
the slogans of radical environmental-
ists very seriously. They have been 
working very hard to “change the sys-
tem” – but so as to keep it fundamen-
tally the same.
   Threatened by the ecological crisis 
and by radical movements, the more 
far-sighted of the intellectuals aligned 
with the dominant class have over 
the past 30 years been exploring and 
debating on how best to undertake 
some kind of “global environmental 
management” so as to “plan” or “reg-
ulate” capital’s exploitation of nature. 
   Over the last fi ve years, many – 
mostly but not only from developed 
countries – have converged on a com-
mon approach: that of “ecological 
modernization” through global neolib-
eral regulation, a “solution” that calls 
for 1) setting up norms enjoining all 
governments to contribute to the goal 
of reducing total global emissions but 
ultimately leaves it to each govern-
ment to decide whether, how, and by 
how much, while at the same time 2) 
engineering market mechanisms (car-
bon markets, taxes, etc.) that aim to 
“put a price on carbon” so as to entice 
capital to transition to “low-carbon” 
investments and technologies and to 
allow them to fi nd “cost-effective” so-
lutions to achieve their targets.
   To be sure, proponents of this solu-
tion have not completely succeeded 
in gaining the consensus of global 
elites. There has been opposition 
from the Global South. In part be-
cause their own ability to secure con-
sent to their rule at home depends on 
getting concessions from the North, 
many if not most ruling elites from 
developing countries have been cam-
paigning for an alternative ecological 
modernization through more social-
democratic global regulation. In this 
solution the world’s states, acting in 
concert as an international authority, 
would collectively set caps on total 
global emissions and undertake glob-
al redistributive policies by directly 
compelling governments to reduce 
their emissions and transfer resourc-
es to developing countries – rather 
than relying primarily on the workings 
of the market to achieve these goals. 
   But wracked by their internal weak-
nesses and contradictions, develop-
ing-country governments have, year 
after year, proven unable – or unwill-
ing – to block the market solution 
proposed by developed countries and 
gain support for their own global solu-
>>
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tions. For all their bitter fi ghts against 
their developed-country counterparts 
in the negotiations, many ruling elites 
from the South ultimately share the 
goal: to transform the system so as 
to keep it fundamentally unchanged.
   The result is that the developed-
country offi cials have been moving 
forward in gradually establishing the 
foundations for a new international 
climate change agreement – to be 
signed in Paris this year and to be 
effective in 2020 – along the lines 
of global neoliberal regulation. But 
this agreement is unlikely to drasti-
cally bring down emissions to levels 
that could avert catastrophic climate 
change or provide resources to cope 
with its effects. We are therefore 
moving toward a new agreement that 
could pave the way for climate chaos 
and a new era of barbarism.
  But there is hope. After all, the 
dominant bloc’s ability to impose this 
solution ultimately rests on their con-
tinuing ability to defl ect resistance – 
something that, in turn, depends on 
their continuing ability to represent 
themselves as “partners.” This, in 
turn, rests on convincing others that 
they are promoting a universal inter-
est and that they can solve the crisis 
under the existing order, all of which 
would require material sacrifi ces that 
the hegemonic bloc appears unwill-
ing or unable to make. Such a fail-
ure by the world’s dominant groups 
to back up their hegemonic claims 
will only breed more disillusionment, 
anger and anxiety, and we’re already 
seeing signs of this in the groups of 
moderate environmentalists who par-
ticipated in the “walk-out” from the 
Lima talks and the growing accept-
ance of the conclusion, reached by 
movements as early as in 1972, that 
those inside the offi cial meeting are 
incapable of passing a “serious cli-
mate change law.” 
   But whether this apparent he-
gemonic crisis will translate into a 
movement capable of mobilizing 
the required social force to counter 
the dominant elites’ non-solutions 
to climate change – whether disil-
lusionment and anxiety will turn into 
active resistance – is by no means 
clear. Much depends on the ability 
to skillfully negotiate a long-standing 
tension: between the goal of bring-
ing as many people from as many 
diverse political tendencies onto 
the streets and the goal of refash-
ioning their “common sense” and 
subjectivities. These two goals have 
not always been congruent because 
forging broad coalitions creates pres-
sures to aim for the “lowest common 
denominator,” pander to existing 
taken-for-granted beliefs, and speak 
the language of “common sense” – a 
language that reinforces rather than 
challenges the claims of the domi-
nant. Without transforming common 
sense, even the broadest coalitions 
and the largest demonstrations could 
end up simply aiding the powerful in 
their goal of changing the system in 
order to keep it the same.
   What is needed is a strategy that 
does not alienate the public but also 
does not shrink from attacking the 
deeply entrenched categories and 
taken-for-granted worldviews and vi-
sions that motivate people to cast 
their lot with the system. This would 
entail scheduling “the big march” after 
rather than before the UN talks have 
ended in Paris so as to repudiate the 
view that “the people” are counting on 
the wisdom and the benevolence of 
the world’s elites to save the planet. 
It would require questioning progres-
sive-sounding solutions that frame 
the climate crisis in terms of states 
rather than class, such as proposals 
to divide the “carbon budget” by coun-
tries. It would involve exhorting even 
progressive, socialist governments to 
embrace non-extractivist, non-fossil-
fuel-dependent development paths.
    Having succeeded in putting “Change 
the system!” on the agenda, the task 
now is to make it persuasive by spelling 
out our “systemic alternatives” and our 
“concrete phantasies.” 
Direct all correspondence to Herbert Docena 
<herbertdocena@gmail.com>
People from across the political spectrum 
fl ooded downtown Lima in one of the 
most militant international climate change 
demonstrations in years. 
Photo by Herbert Docena.
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> Practicing 
   Public Sociology
by Ariane Hanemaayer, University of Alberta, Canada and Christopher J. Schneider, 
Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada 
Ariane Hanemaayer and Christopher Schneider experiment with public 
sociology. Photo by Ariane Hanemaayer.
 T he premise of public sociology is to engage publics in a dialogue of mutual education. There are of course many exciting ways to practice public sociology. In this short essay 
we explore two “analog” versions of practicing public so-
ciology (for “digital” examples see the ISA’s “Public Soci-
ology, Live!” or “e-public sociology” in Hanemaayer and 
Schneider, The Public Sociology Debate). The fi rst prac-
tice involved developing a sociology “philosophers’ café,” 
which we refer to as the Sunday Sociologist. From this 
emerged our second practice, a university course version 
of what we had cultivated during our Sunday Sociologist 
gatherings in a local coffee house. Coffee houses – or 
“penny universities” as they were sometimes called (in 
reference to the penny admission fee) – have historically 
served as important social milieus where dialogical ex-
changes occurred among multiple publics, including stu-
dents, merchants, and intellectuals. 
   Inspired by the “penny university,” in 2009 we launched 
the Sunday Sociologist (www.sundaysociologist.com), hop-
ing to bring together individuals who held a wide range of 
different perspectives. We invited members of the commu-
nity, university faculty, and students to come once a month 
to a local coffee shop in the heart of Kelowna, British Co-
lumbia, Canada, to debate and discuss issues of mutual 
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importance (national news stories, viral videos, political 
projects, etc.). The goal of these meetings was to reach 
diverse populations, on the one hand, and to engage in 
mutual education about matters of local and global im-
portance, on the other. The conversations often prompted 
fruitful and spirited debates, which helped to crystallize, 
shape, and develop our lives as professional sociologists 
by bringing to our attention important private troubles and 
public issues beyond the university classroom.
   We chose to hold our meetings on the second Sunday of 
each month in the early evening. The scheduling refl ected 
a deliberate effort to attract those with full-time employ-
ment who might otherwise be occupied working during the 
week. We advertised our sociologist cafe through a free 
webpage. The monthly gatherings were attended by vari-
ous faculty members, university and high-school students, 
retired folks – as well as one individual, named Brendan, a 
self-identifi ed “vacuum salesman” and “layman.” 
   Although our sociological cafe was named for the day 
of the week, our hope was to highlight the idea that no 
matter our walk of life, political or social persuasion, we 
all ponder sociological questions in our lives – whether we 
know it or not. Unlike the professional chemist, publics 
live in our laboratories – the social shapes them and they 
shape the social. The germ of the sociological imagina-
tion is already present. If the sociological imagination can 
inspire a Sunday evening of refl ection, then the develop-
ment of this type of thinking might be realized as a useful 
tool in the lives of publics we encounter in our coffee 
house gatherings. 
   The Sunday Sociologist inspired a university-sponsored 
course with its own syllabus. The idea was to invite mem-
bers of the public to attend a sociology course. Each week 
an invited sociologist would offer an hour-long lecture in a 
publicly accessible manner, followed by an hour of small 
group discussion (the course was capped at 30 students). 
The course and each guest speaker were advertised week-
ly through university press releases and on social media 
(weekly attendance was usually around 100 people). So-
ciology students and members of the public were distrib-
uted between discussion groups so that they could engage 
in mutual dialogue. Then, together with invited sociology 
professors and the teaching assistant, we would move be-
tween groups, to listen, and to interject sociological mate-
rials into the dialogue. 
   Some of the people who frequented the Sunday Sociolo-
gist regularly attended the course. Reactions were enthu-
siastic! For example, the self-described vacuum salesman 
Brendan noted: “Being able to take part in these conversa-
tions, and fi nding out to my amazement that I have some-
thing to contribute has been empowering and energizing in 
a way that I have never experienced before.” Another pub-
lic member attendee noted: “It has been a privilege and 
pleasure for someone not far short of 80 years, to listen to 
and mingle with younger and livelier minds.” 
   These initiatives in public sociology prompted us to think 
about our professional sociological commitments and per-
spectives. One of the most frequent dilemmas we encoun-
tered was how to make complex sociological ideas relevant 
and clear. We found our work within the community to be 
a demanding addition to our professional work, but an in-
credibly rewarding public teaching experience. There was 
a lot of public support for our projects, and we found it 
encouraging to explore new and innovative ways to engage 
communities in our work. The broader context likely con-
tributed to the successes of these projects. 
   Kelowna is a particularly affl uent retirement commu-
nity, a very desirable place to live in the southern interior 
of British Columbia. Many of the public attendees at the 
Sunday Sociologist and the Public Sociology course were 
retired well-to-do individuals with undergraduate degrees. 
For example, Joyce, a regular public attendee of the Sun-
day Sociologist and the course, noted: “I’d forgotten how 
much I enjoyed college sociology in the 70s and 80s and 
how stimulated I feel again.” Attempts to develop simi-
lar projects in working-class communities of laborers, for 
example, might run into different challenges. Our project 
relied on assumptions that were specifi c to the community 
in which we created these projects: we could assume most 
individuals had access to computers and the internet, that 
they listened to local news and left-leaning radio channels 
which advertised the events, and that they were motivated 
to engage with the university in alternative capacities. So-
ciologists hoping to bring similar initiatives to their home 
communities might consider the challenges that might 
arise in the milieu within which they are working, in order 
to devise strategies through which to engage publics in 
their specifi c contexts.
Direct all correspondence to Ariane Hanemaayer <ahanemaa@ualberta.ca> and 
Christopher J. Schneider <cschneider@wlu.ca>
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> Re-claiming the 
   Right to the City
Popular Mobilization in Chile
by Simón Escoffi er, Oxford University, UK
A mural in Villa Francia, one of Santiago’s 
contentious neighborhoods, exhorts residents 
to “Organize for struggle, struggle to win.” 
Photo by Nathalie Vuillemin.
 D espite a long history of social mobilization, since 1990 Chile’s urban poor have often been portrayed as passive political actors suf-fering from segregation and social illnesses. 
Based on my research in the borough of Peñalolén in San-
tiago, however, I argue that in some cases at least, the 
urban poor have been able to organize sustainable resist-
ance, re-claiming their right to the city.
   David Harvey (2008: 23) defi nes the right to the city as 
“the right to change ourselves by changing the city.” Con-
necting urbanization and capitalism, and in line with an 
academic tradition that asserts the priority of people over 
profi t, Harvey suggests that human beings deserve the ca-
pacity to re-shape processes of urbanization by exercising 
collective power. For poor dwellers, exercising the right to 
the city often involves defending their urban habitat and 
their access to services and resources in the city, resisting 
urban processes of capitalist surplus production.
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   Mainstream scholarly accounts suggest that, through 
consistent collective mobilization, the Chilean urban poor 
have managed to effectively claim their right to the city – 
although at some times more systematically than others. 
Collective struggles over housing by Chile’s urban poor can 
be traced back to the 1920s. In connection with political 
parties and many other institutions, the so-called “dwell-
ers movement”1 took a central role in the national politi-
cal arena, pressuring the government through urban land 
takeovers. Between 1957 and 1970 land occupations be-
came increasingly popular, reshaping Chilean cities, espe-
cially Santiago. In fact, in 1972, during the Allende admin-
istration, 16.6% of Santiago’s population lived in informal 
settlements (Santa María, 1973: 105).
   As the home territories of leftist organizations, many 
shantytowns were severely repressed by the military dic-
tatorship (1973-1989). Some became strongholds of 
grassroots resistance, playing a crucial role in the national 
PROTEST IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
protests that from 1983 exposed the cruelty of the au-
thoritarian regime.
   After 1990 – when Chile restored its democracy – the 
prolifi c and coordinated dwellers’ actions vanished from the 
academic literature. Although several research centers de-
voted attention to popular mobilization through the 1980s – 
e.g. University of Chile, PUC, CIDU, SUR, Flacso, Vicaría de 
la Solidaridad – in the 1990s academic accounts empha-
sized demobilization rather than collective action, describ-
ing shantytowns as nests of criminality, drug traffi cking and 
other social illnesses (Hipsher, 1996; Tironi, 2003).
   Santiago’s Eastern district of Peñalolén – as well as 
other initiatives developed in Chilean cities – offers a coun-
ter-example to those narratives of demobilization. In fact, 
Peñalolén’s popular neighborhoods have systematically 
held contentious political initiatives over the past 25 years, 
managing not only to claim their rights, but also to directly 
shape the district and residents’ immediate environment.
   Demanding their “right to live,” organized through the 
Coordination of Committees of People with No House, al-
most 900 squatter families coming from different parts 
of Peñalolén invaded high-price land in the east of the 
district. In the winter of 1992 they produced Esperanza 
Andina: the fi rst land occupation of Chile’s new demo-
cratic regime. Through strong communitarian organization, 
rejecting co-optation by political parties and the govern-
ment, Esperanza Andina managed to assertively demand 
social housing within the local urban habitat – avoiding the 
peripheral relocation of the poor so often central to social 
housing policies. After several years of struggles, confl icts, 
and negotiations dwellers obtained land rights formalizing 
their neighborhoods, and acquired subsidies to build hous-
es in the same lots.
   In July 1999 the persistent housing demand, along with 
dwellers’ rejection of expulsion to the urban peripheries, 
led to another land occupation in Peñalolén. What became 
known as “Toma de Peñalolén” was clearly the biggest 
land occupation in Chile since 1990. Involving more than 
1,800 families, the Toma pressured authorities to provide 
social housing subsidies within the district. Although the 
Toma’s organization eventually split, excluding a more radi-
cal faction from negotiations, by 2006 nearly 900 families 
were re-located in houses constructed in Peñalolén, while 
most others were allocated lots in other districts.
   Peñalolén’s struggle over social housing has persisted 
until today. In fact, since 2006 the Movement of Dwellers 
in the Struggle (MPL) – a leftist grassroots organization 
born in the district – has coordinated local housing com-
mittees to demand a right to social housing in their district 
of residence.
   Events in Peñalolén have however demonstrated that 
struggling over social housing may not be enough for poor 
dwellers to assert substantive rights in the city. In 2009 
residents’ and grassroots organizations became aware that 
a new master plan for Peñalolén was to be implemented. 
Changing land regulation to allow the construction of build-
ings, incorporating new motorways to improve car access to 
the district, and attracting new retail shops, the new master 
plan aimed to upgrade the district by increasing land values. 
Additionally, the master plan did not include enough land 
to cover the district’s need for social housing. While some 
neighbors found those changes convenient, most resilient 
grassroots organizations rejected the looming gentrifi ca-
tion process. Those organizations campaigned against the 
new master plan, calling for a legally binding district refer-
endum. After disputed campaigns by the Municipality and 
local neighborhood organizations, in late December 2011 
the master plan was democratically rejected. Protecting the 
district from gentrifi cation, poor dwellers have managed to 
conserve an urban habitat that they created through self-
construction and squatting in the 1960s and 70s.
   Peñalolén’s eastern neighborhood, Lo Hermida, has de-
veloped a strong culture of contentious mobilization in the 
last 25 years. Drawing on communitarian values and an 
identity based in collective action, neighbors carry out dif-
ferent initiatives to collectively re-incorporate local zones 
that have been co-opted by other social actors. For exam-
ple, residents organize music workshops or community or-
chards in neighborhood squares as a form of re-signifying 
and re-occupying zones taken by drug traffi ckers or threat-
ened by private companies.
   Historically condensing events of collective contestation, 
Peñalolén echoes many other initiatives by the Chilean ur-
ban poor that uphold their substantive access to rights in 
the city (Sugranyes, 2010). These struggles demonstrate 
that the Chilean urban poor are still able to mount effec-
tive, sustainable contentious collective action, demanding 
their right to the city.
Direct all correspondence to Simón Escoffi er <simon.escoffi er@sant.ox.ac.uk>
1 The movement by the Chilean urban poor between the 1920s and 1989 has 
been traditionally called “movimiento de pobladores” in Spanish. Although I use 
“pobladores” and “dwellers” interchangeably, this is not totally precise, for the 
word in Spanish has historically acquired a political meaning in Chile: it refers to 
urban poor residents who fi ght for their collective rights.
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> Squatters 
   and Politics
in Uruguay
 Montevideo changed drastically during the last two decades of the twentieth century: in the confl uence of neoliberalism and de-mocratization, Uruguay’s capital city grew 
increasingly unequal and segregated. Perhaps the most 
visible change – if only the tip of the iceberg – was the 
growth of informal settlements.
   Montevideo’s squatter areas went through changes that 
were both quantitative and qualitative. Informal settlements 
expanded dramatically, but paradoxically, they were increas-
ingly planned. Structural conditions, such as persistent de-
industrialization, poverty, state retrenchment, low real wag-
es, and perhaps even more directly, rising rents undoubtedly 
lie behind these changes. Yet, the picture remains incom-
plete if we do not examine the role of politics as well as of 
economic changes – the surge in land invasions was also 
shaped by democratization and electoral competition. 
   While many think of squatting as a spontaneous process, 
a “natural” consequence of harsh economic conditions, a 
closer look at Montevideo reveals the importance of or-
ganization as political networks responded to political op-
portunities such as elections or decentralization. 
A precarious squatter settlement in Montevideo that grew on the 
fringes of an earlier planned occupation. 
Photo by María José Álvarez Rivadulla.
by María José Álvarez Rivadulla, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, Colombia and Board 
Member of ISA Research Committee on Regional and Urban Development (RC21)
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   In Latin America, the role of states and politics in shap-
ing squatter settlements has long attracted attention in 
part because this relationship has been stronger than else-
where. Yet Montevideo’s case is somewhat unusual, even 
in Latin America. Although land invasions-by-accretion, 
dubbed cantegriles, have occurred occasionally since the 
1940s, the Uruguayan capital was able to absorb most ru-
ral migrants coming to the city during state-led industriali-
zation through formal housing. Even in the 1980s, despite 
warning signs of growing urban socio-economic inequality, 
Montevideo was still more egalitarian than other cities of 
the continent, both economically and spatially. 
   But in the 1990s, squatter areas began to expand: in 
1999, half of all Montevideo’s squatter settlements were 
less than fi fteen years old, and about a third of these new 
settlements stemmed from organized land seizures. Some 
planned invasions even had a utopian intention, at least 
at the beginning: early residents wanted something more 
than solving basic housing needs. Generally emerging from 
radical factions of the left, their leaders saw planned land 
invasions as a grassroots kind of land reform, an implicit 
criticism of state housing policies. Others, less utopian, 
nevertheless organized to seize land, measuring and dis-
tributing plots, helping fellow squatters construct houses, 
delineating streets and public spaces, solving everyday 
needs, creating and enforcing norms. Further, they organ-
ized to demand public services, schools, health centers 
and neighborhood legalization. Squatter settlements are 
perhaps the most vital manifestation of recent political ac-
tion by the urban poor in Uruguay, much as Portes and 
Walton described in their book Urban Latin America, for 
the rest of the continent 30 or 40 years earlier.
   What lies behind this shift? The question is especially 
intriguing since Montevideo has not experienced actual 
population growth: rural migrants usually populate informal 
settlements elsewhere, but not in this city. Many of Montevi-
deo’s squatters came from more established city neighbor-
hoods, forced to move when they formed new families or 
as a result of precarious employment conditions linked to 
deindustrialization; others were expelled by soaring rents. 
   Yet, economic factors alone cannot explain why some 
groups and needy families decided to squat at particu-
lar moments and not at other more desperate times, for 
example, the 2002 economic crisis. Politics, and par-
ticularly electoral politics, mediated the emergence and 
consolidation of Montevideo’s new neighborhoods, espe-
cially the planned ones. The end of Uruguay’s dictatorship 
and the emergence of the leftist coalition Frente Amplio 
[Broad Front] as a third political force threatening to win, 
and fi nally winning power in the Montevideo municipality 
in 1990, increased electoral competition in the city – and 
amplifi ed all parties’ incentives to tolerate, and even facili-
tate, new land invasions. 
   Most leaders of organized squatter settlements formed 
around the 1990s had ties with politicians of different par-
ties. Though most insisted “we are apolitical here,” they 
were in fact hyper-political. In the past, community lead-
ers might have turned to the Colorado Party to get roads 
repaired, because the Minister of Public Works came from 
the Colorado Party; but they would also maintain ties with 
a Frente Amplio councilman, who could provide informa-
tion about land available for squatting, while also trying to 
stay in the good books of a deputy from the Blanco Party 
who visited the settlement. 
   Soon, however, all the city’s actors began to realize that 
what seemed a housing solution for needy families, or a 
way to gain votes for a party, could create big problems for 
the future. The living conditions in squatter settlements 
are precarious, and service provision can be prohibitively 
expensive – at a time when previously-occupied houses 
in formal neighborhoods fully equipped with public ser-
vices stand empty. Municipal offi cials and politicians were 
very aware of this problem, which helps to explain why the 
number of land invasions did not surge during the 2002 
economic crisis, and why outgoing President Mujica – usu-
ally sensitive to popular causes – personally intervened in 
a publicized land eviction in 2011. In addition, electoral 
competition for the votes of the urban poor diminished 
when the left formed the national government for a second 
time, in 2009. 
   Although Montevideo’s wave of land invasions may have 
been relatively short-lived, its consequences have left en-
during urban and social traces. Even during the country’s 
current economic boom, the asentamientos (squatter 
settlements) still have reduced access to services, and 
experience a myriad of social and economic problems. 
The slum-upgrading program has expanded to many new 
neighborhoods, yet there is a limit to what infrastructure 
can do. Twenty to 25 years cannot be easily undone: a 
whole generation of kids who grew up in precarious condi-
tions and in segregated poverty still carry the stigma of 
coming from squatter settlements, areas identifi ed as red 
zones by the rest of the city’s residents. 
   Yet things are being done. Well-endowed public parks are 
being built in particularly deprived areas, close to squat-
ter settlements. New housing programs are being imple-
mented. A tax exemption incentive sparked the construc-
tion of social housing by private contractors in different 
areas of the city. Housing cooperatives have also been 
growing. Nevertheless, the effective inclusion of squatter 
settlements and their inhabitants still remains one of Mon-
tevideo’s greatest challenges.
Direct all correspondence to María José Álvarez Rivadulla 
<majo.alvarez.rivadulla@gmail.com>
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> The Growth of Brazil’s
Homeless Workers’ 
Movement
by Cibele Rizek and André Dal’Bó, University of São Paulo, Brazil
>>
 B razil’s Homeless Workers Movement (MTST) was established in the late 1990s, uniting “workers, laborers, informal, underemployed and unemployed, who like millions of Brazilians 
have no access to decent housing, but instead live in rent-
als, in risky areas or situations of urban insecurity, located 
mainly in Brazil’s urban peripheries.” Now an energetic ac-
tor in Brazil’s urban politics, the MTST organized many of 
the street demonstrations that roiled Brazilian society dur-
ing the last year, and its organizational dynamics offer a 
unique lens into the country’s political debates. 
   Importantly, this movement has signifi cant differences 
from the housing movements that emerged in the 1980s, 
which are now aligned with the federal government headed 
by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Although the MTST 
was initially linked to the Landless Movement (MST – a basi-
cally agrarian insertion movement), the Homeless Workers 
Movement was founded during the 1997 National Peoples’ 
March, when landless movement activists were engaged in 
the Oziel Park urban occupation in Campinas, in the state of 
São Paulo. The fi rst occupation by the MTST, named Anita 
Garibaldi, was organized fi ve years later in Guarulhos. 
March of MTST at Paulista Avenue, downtown São Paulo, demanding 
“More popular reforms, more rights.”
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   Since that fi rst occupation, the MTST has organized at 
least ten major occupations in the metropolitan regions of 
São Paulo and Campinas, including encampments called 
Chico Mendes (Taboo da Serra, 2005); João Candido 
(Itapecerica da Serra, 2007); Frei Tito (Campinas, 2007); 
Jesus Silverio (Embu das Artes, 2008); Zumbi dos Pal-
mares (Sumaré, 2008); Dandara (Hortolandia and Santo 
André simultaneously, 2011); and the Novos Pinheirinhos 
(Santo André and Embu das Artes, 2012).
   In June 2013, Brazil experienced an intense process of 
popular street protests, marking the end of a long period 
of popular demobilization linked to neoliberal policy shifts. 
Not coincidentally, the MTST has been increasingly active, 
clashing almost daily with private developers, the real es-
tate market and the state. In addition to frequent street 
demonstrations, between June 2013 and August 2014, 
MTST-inspired occupations of abandoned and idle land 
and buildings have increased exponentially in São Paulo 
and other metropolitan areas: over 100 actions have been 
registered across Brazil over the past twelve months.
   Brazil suffers from a growing housing shortage, with the 
defi cit in metropolitan areas increasing by ten percent be-
tween 2011 and 2012. Thousands of Brazilian families 
are evicted from their homes every day by the exploding 
prices of land, real estate and rentals, characteristics of 
the current cycle of the real estate market boom. This 
housing defi cit has occurred even as the Brazilian govern-
ment implements the largest public housing program in 
the country’s history. Together with other social programs, 
the program known as ‘My House My Life’ (MCMV, which 
stands for Minha Casa Minha Vida) has contributed to eco-
nomic growth, by promoting job creation, and access to 
consumption and services previously restricted to higher 
income classes. 
   Ironically, however, the social housing program has also 
strengthened urban segregation and exclusion, neither 
helping the poorest Brazilians from settling permanently 
in central city regions nor providing the services and infra-
structure necessary for the daily life of the new residents 
of the expanding urban peripheries. 
   In this context, the Homeless Workers’ Movement’s 
protests have played a key role in shaping Brazilian ur-
ban policy. However, the movement’s growing links to the 
government’s social housing program have complicated 
its stance: negotiations over occupations have placed the 
movement simultaneously “inside” and “outside” govern-
ment policy debates. 
   This ambiguity can be seen most clearly in the out-
come of the movement’s occupations. Once an MTST oc-
cupation opens negotiations with a municipality, the city 
authorities are asked to expropriate occupied land – and 
then, frequently, the MTST calls for the inclusion of fami-
lies involved in the occupation in the government’s social 
housing program. But new social housing may well con-
tribute to spatial segregation, since new housing for the 
poor is almost inevitably constructed on urban peripheries, 
further exacerbating spatial inequality.
   The MTST fi nds itself caught in an ambiguous position. 
Even as activists negotiate for places in the housing pro-
gram – a public policy implemented by the real estate 
market – its occupations and street protests continue to 
be violently repressed through evictions, arrests, and even 
killings. Thus the Homeless Movement continues to illus-
trate what might otherwise remain hidden under Brazilian 
social policies: the unjust and unequal character of Bra-
zil’s cities, the partial nature of the changes and social 
programs, the ongoing confl ict and political struggle even 
after twelve years of Workers’ Party dominance. And, per-
haps even more importantly, as a key protagonist in Bra-
zil’s social struggles, the movement embodies the hope of 
a more just and egalitarian future for Brazil’s impoverished 
urban populations.
Direct all correspondence to Cibele Rizek <cibelesr@uol.com.br>
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> Poor People’s 
   Protests
by Prishani Naidoo, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa
>>
 T he dominant narrative of South Africa’s fi rst twenty years of non-racial elector-al democracy emphasizes 
the successes of the formal political 
institutions, players, policies and pro-
cesses shaped and activated in this 
period. Nonetheless, the informal in-
trudes constantly, perhaps most vocal-
ly in the form of protests that emerge 
in the fi rst instance outside of any po-
litical party, organization or trade un-
ion, amongst poor people who come 
together around common problems 
that they face in their everyday lives.
 
   Of particular signifi cance are strug-
gles of those in informal settlements 
and townships – places established 
by apartheid planners to entrench 
living conditions of “permanent infor-
mality” for black people. Such con-
Orlando residents in Soweto protest their 
community’s exclusion from construction 
projects before the 2010 World Cup. 
Photo by Nicolas Dieltiens. 
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in South Africa
ditions were imagined as being nec-
essary to keep black people in their 
subservient positions and “out of 
trouble.” After all, it was in response 
to illegal squatting by black people in 
the urban areas that the apartheid 
state had been forced over the years 
to evolve policies aimed at control-
ling the movement of black people 
(imagined only as cheap labor). 
These included the very establish-
ment of “informal towns” and town-
ships. But it was also in and from 
such spaces that struggles against 
apartheid fl ourished, and a differ-
ent imagination of a life to be – after 
apartheid – was cultivated. 
   Today, over twenty years after the 
formal dismantling of apartheid in-
stitutions and policies, informality 
continues to characterize the lives of 
large numbers of the poor in South 
Africa. They are housed in (still grow-
ing) settlements in which apartheid-
style living conditions persist. It is 
no wonder, then, that since the late 
1990s, at least every winter (but in-
creasingly throughout the year), poor 
residents of townships and informal 
settlements take to their local streets 
and highways to demand proper ac-
cess to the resources necessary for 
a decent standard and quality of life, 
including water, electricity and decent 
housing (basic services). This has be-
come an increasingly common fea-
ture of South African life, with a fi rst 
small expansion at the beginning of 
the 2000s and a much bigger rate of 
proliferation since 2004. 
   As early as 1997, isolated incidents 
were reported across the country of 
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groups of poor residents protesting 
at being cut off from their household 
supplies of electricity and water. Over 
the following three years, such reports 
became far more common as poor 
communities felt the effects of the in-
creasing implementation of different 
forms of privatization, coupled with 
job losses and the fl exibilization of la-
bor – the result of a neoliberal macro-
economic policy agenda adopted by 
the ANC government in 1996. Water 
and electricity cut-offs and housing 
evictions increased as municipalities 
enforced a logic of payment for basic 
services. The affected residents came 
together to refuse the conditions im-
posed on them, engaging in various 
forms of protest (from marches and 
pickets, to refusing offi cials entry to 
worksites, damaging offi cial property, 
and illegal reconnections to supplies 
of water and electricity). In these 
struggles they collaborated with other 
independent activists who were be-
ginning to identify a common enemy 
across seemingly different and sepa-
rate struggles – a common enemy 
that they named “neoliberalism.” 
   By 2001, the sustained actions 
and critiques of groups involved led 
to commentators proclaiming the 
emergence of “new social and com-
munity movements,” whose signifi -
cance lay in that they were the fi rst 
movements post-1994 to situate 
themselves outside of (and in an an-
tagonistic position to) the ANC and 
the broader Congress movement. In 
an infl uential book published in 2002 
with the title We Are The Poors, so-
ciologist Ashwin Desai proclaimed 
the birth of a new political subject, 
“the poors,” born in the struggles 
of communities organizing (together 
with students, academics, research-
ers and other independent activists) 
to fi ght against the various effects of 
the ANC government’s adoption of 
neoliberal policies. 
   By 2004, many of these movements 
had entered a period of decline. The 
cumulative effects of state repres-
sion, intra-organizational political 
battles, and diffi culties with access-
ing resources took their toll on col-
lectives driven largely by the energy 
and commitment of members (a ma-
jority unemployed and poor). In many 
cases, the very responses of the state 
to movement demands resulted in 
their paralysis. Ironically, 2004 was 
also the year that marked the begin-
ning of an even bigger proliferation of 
struggles, very much like those made 
popular by the new movements of the 
early 2000s. Once again, the infor-
mal realm of politics would intrude, 
the formal responses to the earlier 
struggles having failed to satisfy the 
needs of all. 
   In fact, the proliferation of local-lev-
el protests led by poor people outside 
of any formal political structures since 
2004 has been so striking as to lead 
to its description as a “rebellion of 
the poor,” by sociologist Peter Alexan-
der. It has also seen the mainstream 
media coin and popularize the term 
“service delivery protests” as short-
hand for such actions. Although poor 
“service delivery” (including basic ser-
vices and the provision of infrastruc-
ture) is almost always at the heart 
of such protests, corrupt councilors, 
mismanagement of common funds 
and property, and poor communica-
tion between municipalities and their 
residents are often the catalysts for 
action. By 2012, protests were taking 
place at the rate of at least one a day.
   In many cases, protests only erupt 
once residents have exhausted en-
gagement through the offi cial chan-
nels and have received no response 
from the municipality. In a collection of 
case studies entitled The Smoke That 
Calls, published by Karl Von Holdt et 
al. in 2011, protesters contend that 
sometimes the only way to get the 
attention of the relevant authorities 
is to set property alight or burn tires 
in barricades (to make “the smoke 
that calls”). Increasing actions of 
this nature have resulted in the me-
dia’s increasing use of the label “vio-
lent service delivery protests.” At the 
same time, the actions of the police 
have become increasingly violent, with 
newspapers reporting the death of at 
least 43 protesters at the hands of the 
police since 2009.
   Protests today are also often linked 
to differences within the local struc-
tures of the ANC and its aligned forma-
tions. This has seen the mobilization of 
groups of ANC members against their 
own elected leaders in municipalities. 
Sometimes these result from battles 
lost within the party or the state, and 
sometimes to expose and question 
the very forms of state patronage and 
access to channels for self-enrichment 
(through tenders, access to jobs and 
funding). As splits from within the ANC 
fold play themselves out, it will be inter-
esting to see how new political players 
like the Economic Freedom Fighters 
(EFF) and the United Front (launched 
by the National Union of Metalworkers 
together with other community and 
civil society formations) will relate to 
such local struggles of the poor. 
   Although political players tend to di-
rect their attention to the realm of for-
mal politics (parties and parliament), 
the informal continues to present it-
self as an ongoing site of contesta-
tion at a local level. It is here that the 
potential for alternative forms of en-
gagement and production lies. A lot, 
however, depends on the collective 
potential and commitment to imagine 
politics differently.
Direct all correspondence to Prishani Naidoo 
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> Zambia:
by Singumbe Muyeba, University of Cape Town, South Africa
>>
 I n April 2013, fi fteen armored vehicles and policemen stormed plot 10144 in Lusaka West. Unsuspecting residents woke 
up to the shock of being evicted. They 
could not do anything but watch be-
cause they were being threatened 
with weapons. Police demolished 33 
houses. About 365 people, many 
of whom had occupied the land for 
twenty years became homeless. 
Some evictees were low-ranking 
police offi cers. There was no evic-
tion notice provided. The Lusaka 
City Council and court bailiffs were 
As evicted residents discuss options, a child 
stands over debris from one of the houses 
demolished during an eviction in Chinika, 
Lusaka, carried out by Zambia National 
Service troops. 
Photo by Emmanuel Tembo.
Evictions without 
Social Movements
not present. After the eviction, sen-
ior police offi cers appropriated the 
land for themselves. More evictions 
and demolitions followed during that 
month. Frustrated, on May 15 evicted 
families marched in solidarity towards 
the Vice-President’s Offi ce but were 
stopped and dispersed by armed po-
lice. They did not possess a police 
permit, a requirement of the Public 
Order Act. Evictees had no one to turn 
to but themselves. Why was this spark 
not enough to begin a movement to 
prevent land evictions and why have 
existing housing social movements 
PROTEST IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
failed to protect the evicted? Here 
I explore possible answers to these 
questions.
   The Lusaka West case was just 
one case among many. Evictions in-
volving hundreds of households have 
occurred without inspiring organized 
action. In 2014 alone, several took 
place in Lusaka – fourteen houses 
were demolished on July 25 in Kany-
ama, 100 houses were demolished 
in Chinika on October 3 and on No-
vember 18 soldiers forcefully evicted 
villagers in Mikango Barracks. The 
 27
GD VOL. 5 / # 1 / MARCH 2015
policy of demolishing housing built il-
legally on public and private land goes 
back to the Zambia government’s pol-
icy announced in 2007. Since com-
ing to power in 2011, the Patriotic 
Front government has continued to 
eradicate illegal and even some up-
graded squatter settlements – settle-
ments that had acquired this status 
as part of the policy of previous gov-
ernments. In the process of demoli-
tion, legal procedures have not been 
followed, and in some cases evictions 
have resulted in fatalities. This has 
only raised public concern. 
   These conditions are fertile for so-
cial mobilization – 70% of the urban 
population live in slums, which means 
it has a squatter settlement and ur-
ban population that could easily 
reach a critical mass; and the country 
has a strong documented history of 
protest and collective action. 
  How to explain the absence of pro-
test? First, there is a long history 
of intolerance from among political 
elites starting with the maintenance 
of the Public Order Act of 1955. The 
Act was used by the British coloni-
al administration to impose control 
over freedom fi ghters. Succeeding 
presidents have not repealed it. The 
Act requires protesters to obtain a 
permit through the police and Min-
ister of Home Affairs. It is however 
vague as to the grounds for granting 
permits. They can only be obtained 
seven days before the day of protest. 
When the cause falls outside what is 
recognized by the law or when there 
is opposition from political elites, 
permits are often not granted. More-
over, the law does not recognize de 
facto tenure rights, so evictees from 
illegal settlements do not have legal 
backing for protest, despite having 
lived on the land for many years. 
   It is not only reactionary character 
of the political elite that contributes to 
the lack of protest, but also fear of the 
consequences of marching without 
a permit. Violation of the Public Or-
der Act is often accompanied by use 
of police brutality evoking fear even 
among settlers in upgraded squat-
ter settlements. For example, during 
forced evictions in Kampasa near the 
airport on June 14, 2013, two men 
were fatally shot, and one injured by 
the Zambia National Service. My in-
terviewees in the upgraded squatter 
settlement, George, worried about the 
recent evictions and contemplated 
their own position even when they had 
a measure of tenure security through 
occupancy licenses. When asked what 
they would do if the government came 
to repossess their land, they felt that 
they would have to give it up and fi nd 
somewhere else to go.
   Government and civil society fail to 
protect potential evictees because of 
scarcity of fi nancial resources. The 
right to housing is not enshrined in 
the constitution because, as Presi-
dent Mwanawasa argued in 2008, 
the government would then have to 
commit fi nancial resources to ensure 
the fulfi lment of that right – fi nances 
it claims it does not have. In this way, 
the government has publicly refused 
the obligation to compensate evict-
ees. Rather than provide resources to 
improve the informal settlements, it 
is cheaper to simply demolish them. 
   Civil society also lacks the fi nan-
cial resources to protect illegal settle-
ment dwellers from eviction. Although 
there is a strong presence of Zambia 
Land Alliance and Homeless Interna-
tional through an organization called 
The People’s Process on Housing and 
Poverty in Zambia which, in princi-
ple, should take up the fi ght against 
evictions, in reality they don’t. “Often 
times the alliance has not mobilized 
communities or handled land cases 
of public interest as expected by the 
public sometimes due to the lack of 
capacity or resources to follow up 
the cases” (Zambia Land Alliance, 
2014, http://www.zla.org.zm/?p=9). 
In 2010, accusations of corruption 
led to suspension of disbursements 
of aid to both government and civil 
society organizations, which ground 
many projects to a halt for almost 2 
years. Thus, these organizations only 
go as far as issuing statements and 
threats of demonstrations without ac-
tual follow-through. 
   In summary the two main challenges 
to the rise of an anti-eviction move-
ment in Lusaka and to new social 
movements in Zambia are, fi rst, the 
open hostility to any form of protest on 
the part of political elites and, second, 
the limited fi nancial resources avail-
able to government and civil society 
to solve the housing problem. Once 
people are evicted they see no op-
portunity for redress and so collective 
protest would have no purpose. Only 
changes in the law on public order 
and increased economic growth could 
provide conditions under which anti-
eviction movements might arise.
Direct all correspondence to Singumbe Muyeba 
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>>
> Fablabs and Hackerspaces
A New Culture 
in the Making
by Isabelle Berrebi-Hoffmann, Marie-Christine Bureau, and Michel Lallement, LISE-CNRS, 
Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, Paris, France 
 N ew forms of sharing, as well as new ways of collaborative production and consumption, are raising questions for the current economy. Fablabs and hackerspaces have a particular 
place in this context where commons-inspired wealth is 
based on access and use rather than property. These col-
lective manufacturing spaces, which appeared in the mid-
2000s, are introducing a new work ethic: a maker culture. 
Dispersed all over the world, these spaces have different 
names: fablabs (fabrication laboratories), hackerspaces, 
A typical hackerspace. 
Photo by Michel Lallement.
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makerspaces, living labs, tech shops, among others. They 
are an invitation to rediscover the pleasure of throwing 
different objects together, of coding software programs, 
or simply imagining new styles of clothing and cooking. 
Across the globe, major metropolises are welcoming these 
new spaces that simultaneously promote new ways of 
manufacturing, collaboration, consumption and learning.  
   A 3D printer is often the center of attention at these 
sites, as it allows for the production of any object, using 
plans found on the Internet. Although results are still mod-
est, progress is astounding. Most of these spaces also 
have professional equipment such as numerical control 
machines: cutters, laser cutters, silkscreen printers. Only a 
few years ago, months of training were necessary to suc-
cessfully operate one of these machine tools to manufac-
ture prototypes. Today, training to use them correctly takes 
only a few hours. Moreover, prices of machines and design 
software have dropped signifi cantly. Thus, just as personal 
computers allow us to navigate the tech world, Personal 
Fabricators can allow anyone to engage the physical world. 
   However, even if they share common values, fabrica-
tion laboratories in Barcelona, Berlin, San Francisco, Paris 
or Beijing are not all alike. Fablabs were founded at MIT 
(Massachusetts) in the early 2000s and have formed a 
worldwide network. Hackerspaces have a different story. 
Their origins lie in California during the early 1970s with 
the Homebrew Computer Club, an incubator where hobby-
ists gathered to explore and invent information technology. 
Some shared their fi ndings for free while others, including 
Steve Jobs and Bill Gates, took a more traditional capi-
talist route. Steeped in hacker spirit, hackerspaces are 
no different from fablabs from an organizational perspec-
tive. Even if coding practices are more advanced at these 
sites, hackerspaces are similarly equipped with materials 
for individuals to manufacture, invent, fi ddle with different 
objects and make something. Moreover, just as with fab-
labs, public access is an important criterion, as well as the 
will to make these spaces not only sites of innovation and 
manufacturing but also places for collective learning and 
sharing knowledge. 
   Fabrication laboratories are partially anchored in the ter-
ritories where they are located. They operate in networks 
that sketch the contours of new productive ecosystems. 
Some observers consider them the beginning of a new in-
dustrial revolution or the avant-garde of a civilized exit from 
capitalism. But one need not go that far to realize that 
these new worlds should be taken seriously. These spaces 
are laden with multiple innovations on technical, political 
and organizational levels. Though they may be located at 
the margins of the dominant economy, their growing suc-
cess is indicative of socio-cultural shifts in the ways people 
work, design, produce, make decisions and take action. 
   Sociologists who have begun to study these new pro-
duction sites show that although these spaces are het-
erogeneous, they have a shared mode of organization, 
partially issued from developer and hacker communities. 
The culture fostered by the free/open source world, found-
ed a few decades ago, introduced new ways of working 
and collaborating relying on egalitarian and horizontal net-
works. They also developed new ways of sharing goods and 
services, for example, through the Copyleft license.1 The 
maker movement, which includes fabrication laboratories, 
also draws inspiration from a tradition critical of industrial 
society, initiated by William Morris in the world of design.   
   A recent survey of hackerspaces we conducted in northern 
California showed that these alternative maker worlds are 
mostly made up of young white educated thirty-year-olds 
disenchanted with academia. These spaces, frequented by 
both Google engineers and homeless techies, have one 
objective: to hack, that is, to innovate by engaging com-
puters, physical objects and even society at large. Some 
makers actively participate in innovation processes for the 
Silicon Valley, while the more radical invest their energy at 
the service of those contesting the established order, such 
as the Occupy movement. In a time of generalized struc-
tural crisis, it is worth examining these alternative spaces, 
real utopias where new ways of working, decision-making, 
consumption and living together are being invented.
Direct all correspondence to Michel Lallement <michel.lallement@cnam.fr>
1 Berrebi-Hoffmann I., Bureau M.-C., Lallement M. (eds.), Recherches sociologiques 
et anthropologiques, special issues “Tiers lieux de fabrication et culture collaborative. 
De nouveaux mondes de production sont-ils en train d’émerger?” (forthcoming). 
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> Pursuing Gender Equality in a
by Bernard Fusulier, FNRS, University of Louvain, Belgium, and Chantal Nicole-Drancourt, 
CNRS-LISE, Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, Paris, France
 D eclining birth rates, decreas-ing employment rates among mothers, and the renuncia-
tion of motherhood are increasingly 
considered major risks, connected 
to the demography and levels of so-
cial welfare in “developed” countries. 
Although the fi nancial and budget-
ary crises of the last few years affect 
all social contracts, they particularly 
threaten the dynamics of gender 
equality and worsen the conditions for 
a work-family balance. 
   Policymakers at all levels report 
growing awareness that women play 
a key role in shaping social cohe-
sion. Women are recognized for their 
contribution to the labor market and 
domestic activities, a double involve-
ment, which is particularly valued in 
diffi cult times, counterbalancing insti-
tutional defi ciencies and disequilib-
rium while ensuring social and eco-
nomic development. 
   A new global consensus recognizes 
that most people hope to take care of 
children and other dependent people, 
while still sustaining professional ca-
reers. They hope to sustain this dou-
ble commitment without questioning 
the existing sexual division of labor 
and associated reproduction activi-
ties, which today, as always, assumes 
that women will take primary respon-
sibility for domestic activities. Con-
sequently, almost all countries now 
agree to help parents to meet these 
two objectives and to make work and 
family balance a major issue for indi-
viduals as much as for society. 
   At fi rst glance, the public diagnoses 
appear sexually neutral: the point is 
to allow everyone to work for an in-
>>
Problematic gender policies in the workplace. 
Illustration by Arbu.
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come. In all countries where the wel-
fare state is strong (as well as in all 
countries where these programs are 
under construction), we see unprec-
edented expansion of social policies 
aimed at reconciling work and family 
obligations – from reforms of tax and 
benefi t systems, to improved man-
agement of child care systems, as 
well as encouragement of practices 
that aim at a better balance of pro-
fessional and family life in terms of 
the organization of work. 
   Yet in all the countries in question, 
a shift is taking place in the imple-
mentation of policies. Despite the 
gender-neutral rhetoric, measures 
laid out in political agendas (or within 
companies) are losing their neutrality 
in practice. Parent and family leaves 
for everyone become privileged ways 
to support working mothers; reduced 
working time for all is diluted through 
an explosion of part-time work for 
women; the length of a birth leave that 
should include both parents is judged 
in terms of its impact on the well-being 
of women and children, etc. In other 
words, at their core, these policies tar-
get not men nor parents but women, 
as actual or potential mothers. In Octo-
ber 2014, for example, Facebook and 
Apple frankly admitted as much, offer-
ing female employees “grappling with 
the competition of men and a more 
and more competitive work market” 
the option to freeze their oocytes so 
that they can consider having children 
once their careers are consolidated.
   In part, this pattern refl ects resist-
ance to changing family patterns 
– changes that take place despite 
measures to help working parents. 
Moreover, maintaining mothers’ em-
ployment – when most mothers take 
on a “double shift” of work and fam-
ily support – becomes a real political 
problem, provoking questions about 
whether requiring women to prior-
itize their “out-of-production” work is 
physically or psychically sustainable, 
and whether these practices trans-
gress ideals of social justice. 
   The battle to reconcile professional 
and family life is still far from being 
won. We begin with general questions 
(how to help parents to balance work 
and family life), but we offer only par-
tial solutions (expecting mothers to 
earn incomes without changing the 
sexual division of labor). 
   To move forward, mobilization must 
start from criticizing and reconstruct-
ing the organizational and institutional 
foundations of the wage-based socie-
ties of the 19th century and the wel-
fare states of the 20th century. We 
must question established social ar-
rangements and deconstruct the nat-
uralness of practices that follow from 
these arrangements. We must ques-
tion social contracts involving gender 
relations: the idea of a world centered 
on production, the assumption of an 
atomized fi gure of the producer sup-
ported by a care-giver, the model of a 
male breadwinner for the family, the 
androcentric pact of solidarity. We 
must deconstruct the social partition 
of productive and reproductive activi-
ties, and the gendered assignment of 
their completion. 
   If we take these propositions seri-
ously, we could then begin to consid-
er an alternative society, starting with 
new frames of reference that would 
no longer treat as secondary social-
ly-useful activities outside employ-
ment. We could begin to transform 
the wage-based society into a “multi-
active society.” Employment would be 
re-imagined relative to other activi-
ties judged worthy of support in terms 
of social investment, without any of 
these activities being either hegem-
onic or reserved for men or women. 
Inactivity or non-work would become 
uncommon and the work-family artic-
ulation would no longer be a burden 
resting primarily on women. 
   This transformation requires the 
progressive construction of a new re-
gime of activities, where the status 
of being “active” would no longer be 
defi ned in terms of a restrictive no-
tion of employment, but rather based 
on a more inclusive notion of work, 
embracing care work and civic labor. 
From this perspective, society would 
no longer focus on paid work and 
overlook non-market forms of work; 
instead, we would move towards a 
broad conception of work emphasiz-
ing and recognizing the usefulness of 
all activities contributing to the well-
being and common good.
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> Negotiating
Chronic 
Illness 
at Work 
by Anne-Marie Waser, Dominique Lhuilier, Frédéric Brugeilles, Pierre Lénel, 
Guillaume Huez, Joëlle Mezza, and Cathy Hermand, Conservatoire national des arts 
et métiers, Paris, France
>>
 I n France, keeping the working-age population em-ployed has become a matter of concern for two reasons: this population is aging and increased per-centages have been diagnosed with chronic illness-
es, particularly cancer. Broad detection programs have 
increased the number of diagnosed cases per year, while 
medical progress, early detection and improved treatments 
with less side effects have transformed several previously 
mortal conditions into chronic illnesses. In France, almost 
15 million people have been diagnosed with a chronic ill-
ness, roughly 20% of the working-age population. 
   Patient organizations have raised concerns about sup-
porting those living with illness or disabilities for a long 
time. However, agencies in charge of developing research 
on several illnesses (hepatitis, HIV, cancer, multiple scle-
rosis, diabetes, among others) have recently begun to 
request qualitative social science research. Specifi cally, 
they are interested in learning more about individuals who 
resume work after a sick leave as well as how they re-
main employed. Within this context, we developed an ac-
tion research project bringing together psychologists and 
sociologists to: a) understand the conditions under which 
a person diagnosed with an illness returns to work and 
remains employed; and b) intervene to offer individual and 
collective resources that favor their employment.
   This action research project was carried out at three 
large French fi rms. Over two and a half years, we stud-
ied groups of people diagnosed with specifi c ailments 
who wished to return to work or pursue any activity that 
people like to do and that may or may not provide mon-
etary resources (care, teaching, volunteer community 
work, etc.). To examine their social conditions, we con-
sidered three hierarchical levels in our study: a) practices 
of human resources management related to workplace 
health and social issues; b) intermediary staff who man-
aged individual cases of sickness leave, chronic fatigue, 
temporary or permanent disability; c) workers who have 
returned to work after a diagnosis as well as their col-
leagues. We analyzed all the elements identifi ed by this 
population as relevant to explaining the impact of an ill-
ness on working life, family life, environment, commu-
nity, among others. More specifi cally, we inquired about 
the obstacles they faced, the resources employed to 
confront these obstacles, and under what conditions 
these resources could be used.
   Our research was not limited to employees with a de-
clared illness or disability. We tried to compare the re-
sources available to employees who had not declared 
their illness to coworkers or supervisors with workers who 
had requested and obtained disability compensations. In 
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order to obtain these social benefi ts, the latter requested 
a certifi cate of illness from an agency in charge of assess-
ing these claims. Importantly, a majority of employees 
in France who have a chronic illness or disability do not 
request these benefi ts. Indeed, only 2.5 million people 
request certifi cates of illness, although some 9.9 million 
could do so. We sought to understand the consequences 
of declaring an illness, as well as the reasons why a ma-
jority might abstain from doing so. 
   Results showed that authorized compensations for 
a certifi ed illness or disability may carry a stigma or be 
perceived as unjust. Issued by interdisciplinary expert 
commissions, these compensations are often quite rigid, 
while illnesses may be more fl exible. They are often mis-
understood in the work environment, as coworkers and 
supervisors are largely excluded from negotiating the type, 
variation and duration of a compensation. Further, there 
is a second obstacle to the implementation of these com-
pensation measures: human resources or health services 
impose these from above, with only partial knowledge of 
real working conditions. Hence, these measures often 
ignore informal arrangements among coworkers, which 
are developed in agreement with management and may 
offer more fl exibility. Based on reciprocity, all the local ar-
rangements we have analyzed produce less tension in the 
workplace than dispositions imposed without prior nego-
tiation. Moreover, the cases of reciprocity we observed 
involved both individual and collective activities. In sum, 
local arrangements were grounded in specifi c contexts. 
   Our study found that successful compensations – those 
perceived by social actors as fair and that endured beyond 
a sickness leave – have several characteristics: they are 
hybrids of legal measures and local arrangements; they 
are articulated by those who encounter diffi culties in the 
workplace; and the compensation is jointly elaborated. 
These social actors spoke in favor of compensations for 
any disability and for any employee. They questioned some 
expert certifi cates of illnesses that offer rights, but were 
perceived as a means of taking advantage of an illness. 
Altogether, actions carried out within fi rms sought to cre-
ate local conditions of reciprocity among those providing 
and receiving aid that went beyond solidarity, goodwill, 
mutual assistance, and disability compensation. We found 
that patient organizations provided real opportunities for 
participants to begin transforming their working conditions. 
Finally, they also allowed individuals to reappropriate the 
meaning of being ill, to reestablish an identity and to bring 
individual situations into the realm of collective rights.
Direct all correspondence to Anne-Marie Waser <anne-marie.waser@cnam.fr>
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> Celebrating 
   Democracy in 
   Indonesia
by Lucia Ratih Kusumadewi, University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia, member of ISA 
Research Committees on Sociology of Religion (RC22) and Social Classes and Social 
Movements (RC47)
 G reetings! Two fi ngers! Don’t forget to vote for Jokowi!” Slank, a famous rock band, sang with joy and jubilation in support of Indonesia’s presidential candidate Jokowi and his vice-
presidential running mate, Jusuf Kalla, at Jakarta’s Bung 
Karno stadium on July 5, 2014. They were joined by tens 
of thousands of fellow supporters: young and old, men and 
women, poor and rich, sang along during the free concert. 
A few moments later the man they had been waiting for 
appeared: Jokowi climbed on the stage and greeted his 
supporters. The atmosphere became electric and clamor-
 “ ous, as the crowds throughout the stadium yelled “Jokowi! Jokowi!” while holding up two fi ngers.
   This year, for the fi rst time, elections in Indonesia were 
transformed into a “real party for people’s democracy.” The 
enthusiasm was unstoppable, as countless people partici-
pated in a vigorous campaign, engaging in activities that 
ranged from designing campaign activities to raising more 
than 295 billion rupiah in donations. On election day, after 
a vigorous political campaign rejecting the kind of money 
politics that had previously been accepted as normal prac-
Supporters of the presidential team of Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla 
organize their campaign in Jakarta.
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tice, people worked together to monitor the elections to 
prevent fraud. 
   This is the face of Indonesia’s exciting new democra-
cy: there has been signifi cant change, from a democracy 
loaded with dirty politics and power-hungry politicians who 
often resorted to devious practices, to radical democratic 
reforms aimed at establishing a more civilized and humane 
democracy. During the recent Indonesian elections, the 
transaction-based political mobilization often practiced by 
the elites of political parties has lost popularity and seems 
on the verge of becoming obsolete. In its place we have 
witnessed the birth of a new political culture, based on 
voluntary participation.
  
   What has caused this change? Few observers would 
have predicted the “reversal” that seemed to occur so sud-
denly, especially after Indonesia’s long history of dirty poli-
tics. Clearly, the “Jokowi Effect” has been a major factor in 
starting the ball rolling, but particular circumstances seem 
to have started the winds of change. At a certain point, the 
universe seemed to say “This is the time” – a time when 
longings for change were answered, and frustration and 
disgust at on-going chaos, corruption and political oligar-
chy reached a climax.
  
   Joko Widodo, better known as Jokowi, has become in-
creasingly popular in the last two years. An entrepreneur 
who started his political career in 2005 as the mayor of 
Solo, one of the major cities in Central Java, Jokowi is 
known as an honest and hardworking man, from a modest 
background. He is also loved for his humanistic approach 
in the implementation of government policies, cleaning up 
corruption in his municipality and working hard to turn the 
city of Solo into a center of tourism and culture. In 2013, 
Jokowi was named the third best mayor in the world by the 
City Mayors Foundation, and in 2014, Jokowi’s name was 
listed in Fortune magazine’s “50 Greatest World Leaders.”
   Jokowi’s success in Solo jump-started his political career. 
Backed by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(PDI-P) – the country’s main opposition party – in 2012 
he was elected governor of Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta. 
Together with the deputy governor Tjahaja Basuki Purnama 
(Ahok), also known for his integrity, Jokowi implemented 
various new programs, including programs for fl ood control 
and traffi c congestion – problems which had not previously 
been taken seriously in this sprawling mega-city. In addi-
tion to controlling the river and improving public transport, 
Jokowi and Ahok also reformed urban planning, health 
care and education in Jakarta.
  
   As the presidential election approached PDI-P advanced 
Jokowi as their presidential candidate. He was paired with 
Jusuf Kalla (JK), a senior politician from the Golkar Party 
and former vice-president. Jokowi’s vision for Indonesia 
was packaged as an invitation to start a “Mental Revolu-
tion,” as Jokowi invited the people of Indonesia to join his 
efforts. Anti-corruption and transparency, mutual help, cre-
ativity, independence and appreciation of differences are 
some of the fundamental values that underpin the Mental 
Revolution.
  
   Once Jokowi and JK were designated as a team, polls 
showed support continuing to expand, especially from 
pro-democracy activists, scholars, musicians and artists, 
young people, students, businessmen and popular class-
es. These supporters worked in communities voluntar-
ily, willingly, going unpaid; some even spent money from 
their own pockets. By contrast their political opponents, 
Prabowo and Hatta, were supported mainly by groups in 
search of power and money, reactionary groups, and cor-
rupt politicians. 
  
   On July 22, 2014, the General Election Commission 
fi nally declared victory for Jokowi-JK, who won 53.1% of 
the vote. The opponents, Prabowo-Hatta, were declared 
defeated with 47.8% of the vote. Many analysts describe 
this as a victory of the people, noting that Jokowi-JK’s vic-
tory is not directly related to support from political parties. 
Jokowi-JK’s supporters were predominantly non-partisan: 
most were not affi liated to a particular political party, and 
many had not participated actively in previous elections.
   Today, we have new hope for a healthy democracy and 
a politics of dignity for the Indonesian people. The new 
culture of voluntary participation in the last elections could 
prove to be an embryo of wider democratic reforms and a 
fi rst step to social transformation in Indonesia.
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> Corporatizing
   Indonesian
   Higher Education
by Kamanto Sunarto, University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia, member of ISA Research 
Committees on Sociology of Education (RC04) and History of Sociology (RC08)
 A fter the Indonesian re-form movement ended 32 years of authoritarian military rule in 1998, the 
state introduced hotly contested edu-
cational reforms. Since 2003 the es-
tablishment of the Constitutional Court 
opened a new venue where society 
could challenge laws it regards as un-
constitutional, and over the past dec-
ade, educational providers, students 
and civil society groups have brought 
suits over the new education laws.
   In 1999 the government issued a 
government regulation which allowed 
the corporatization of certain public 
higher education institutions. Among 
the reasons given for the changes was 
to grant greater autonomy for enhanc-
Students in Jakarta protest against neolib-
eral regulation of education.
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ing national competitiveness in re-
sponse to sharp competition caused 
by processes of globalization. Conse-
quently, between 2000 and 2010 the 
government corporatized six public 
universities and two public institutes.
   The corporatization of public univer-
sities and institutes triggered strong 
reactions from the public, especially 
parents and students. In the past, tui-
tion fees for public higher education 
institutions were tightly controlled 
by the government. As public higher 
education institutions continued to 
expand, government funding could no 
longer keep up with rising educational 
costs so that tuition became an in-
creasingly important source of reve-
nue. Periodic increases in tuition fees 
became common.
   Students of public higher education 
institutions had in the past contest-
ed tuition hikes on their campuses 
through various means such as on-
campus and street demonstrations, 
occupy movements, petitions, public 
debates, criticisms through the mass 
media and, more recently, through 
social media. Many students op-
posed the corporatization of public 
higher education institutions fearing 
higher tuition fees and a more gen-
eral commercialization of education 
that would effectively prohibit under-
privileged students from admission. 
Most of the time, however, these pro-
tests were in vain as campus authori-
ties stood fi rm, knowing they could 
count on government support. 
   In 2003 the state issued a new law 
which among other things proposed 
to corporatize all educational institu-
tions – formal and non-formal, at all 
levels from nursery to tertiary educa-
tion, both public and private. A law 
corporatizing educational institutions 
was subsequently issued in 2009. 
   These two new laws alarmed private 
foundations that ran existing educa-
tional institutions, because their con-
trols would be signifi cantly curtailed. 
In 2006 sixteen private and non-gov-
ernmental organizations asked the 
Court to conduct a judicial review of 
the 2003 law, in particular the article 
on corporatization. The request was 
rejected, however, because the law 
had not yet been enacted. 
   Parents, students and civil society 
organizations also began to request 
judicial reviews because they were 
interested in ensuring free public 
education and preventing the corpo-
ratization of public higher education 
that, in their view, would lead to com-
mercialization. They argued that edu-
cation was a public good, and that 
the entire cost of education was the 
state’s responsibility; they regarded 
any attempt to shift the burden of 
educational costs to society as un-
constitutional.
   In 2009, private and non-govern-
mental organizations together with 
students, teachers, lecturers, par-
ents, and scholars from various re-
gions fi led fi ve separate requests for 
a review of the 2003 and 2009 laws. 
Their effort paid off: the Court revised 
a number of articles in the 2003 law 
and scrapped the entire 2009 law. 
   In most cases, these challenges 
to specifi c aspects of educational 
reform generally refl ected the spe-
cifi c social location of the challenger. 
Organizations that administer educa-
tional providers were interested in the 
sustainability of their private educa-
tional institutions; they opposed cor-
poratization because they would lose 
control over their educational institu-
tions and would face legal uncertain-
ties. After their requests for a review 
of the 2003 law and the 2009 law 
were granted, their resistance to the 
corporatization of educational institu-
tions ended.
   After the 2009 law was declared 
non-binding, however, the state is-
sued in 2012 a new law on higher 
education providing a new legal ba-
sis for the corporatization of public 
higher education institutions. In 2013 
undergraduate law students from a 
public university requested the Court 
to review six articles in the 2012 law; 
however, their requests were rejected. 
   What did the students, parents, 
concerned scholars and civil society 
organizations achieve with their re-
quests for judicial reviews? Although 
the 2003 law was modifi ed and the 
2009 law scrapped, their goals – free 
education and the prevention of the 
corporatization of public higher edu-
cation institutions – were not realized. 
Taken together, the Court’s decisions 
mean that: 
1. Students of public higher institu-
tion have to pay tuition fees, subject 
to government controls;
2. Public higher education institutions 
are required to allocate at least 20% 
of available seats to high-achieving 
but economically underprivileged ap-
plicants, but are not obliged to allo-
cate more than 20%;
3. Public higher education institu-
tions are allowed to rely on different 
student entrance systems; the Court 
linked these decisions to affi rmative 
action while students tend to view 
this policy as commercialization; 
4. The corporatization of eligible pub-
lic higher education institutions now 
continues unopposed.
   Students, parents and civil society 
activists have exhausted all their op-
tions for attaining free public higher 
education, because decisions of the 
Constitutional Court cannot be ap-
pealed. Their defeat has demoralized 
the movement, and at present there 
are no initiatives to oppose the com-
mercialization of higher education. 
Nonetheless, students at various pub-
lic higher education institutions still 
contest tuition fees that are unfair to-
ward low-income families, but the ob-
ject of their contestation is now their 
own institution rather than the state.
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> Labor Movements 
   and Working-Class 
   Politics 
by Hari Nugroho, University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia, member of ISA Research 
Committees on Labor Movements (RC44) and Social Movements, Collective Actions and 
Social Change (RC48)
 A fter a long period of absence from the politi-cal arena, the labor movement in Indonesia seems on the verge of a new political activ-ism. In 2014, a number of union leaders were 
elected to parliament at the district level during the general 
election. This achievement is historic, since there has been 
no genuine representation of the working class in Indone-
sia’s national and local parliament for nearly 50 years. The 
debate about expanding the workers’ struggle beyond the 
workplace into the broader arena has been also roiling, 
>>
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Workers demonstrating on May Day in 
Jakarta, calling for working class solidarity. 
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with several social and political experiments over the past 
decade. We can now ask: can the labor movement trans-
form class politics in Indonesia? 
   The economic liberalization and democratization under-
way since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998 gen-
erated new challenges and a different pattern of industrial 
confl ict. State control has been replaced by market control. 
Mobile and powerful capital in a highly competitive global 
market becomes the “new opponent,” the new threat to 
union development. The basis of new unions is already 
being eroded by excessive fl exibilization of the labor mar-
ket – even before those new unions regained their footing 
following the collapse of Suharto’s corporatist state.
   Today’s conditions prompt unions to focus on anti-fl exi-
bilization. Traditional agendas involving increasing wages, 
freedom of association, and resisting job termination are 
also part of this new framework. Unions attack the state 
for its liberalizing labor policies and companies for impos-
ing precarious working conditions (Juliawan, 2011). Un-
ions have, therefore, campaigned for a more effective 
social security system that would compensate for job in-
securities and the increasing vulnerability of workers. The 
union movement has been at the center of demands to 
transform the social welfare system, thereby creating a 
much broader constituency amidst the loss of thousands 
of union members. 
   Broadening the labor movement’s constituency presents 
new challenges, however, particularly as unions try to 
obtain wider social and political support to deal with ag-
gressive market pressures. Although many unions remain 
conservative, a number of local unions affi liated to pro-
gressive national unions have pursued two strategies. The 
fi rst involves becoming leaders especially within working 
class communities but also building relations with different 
groups, including peasants and street vendors. A second 
strategy involves taking part in electoral politics. Here the 
objective is to build representation in local parliaments, 
opening a pathway for national representation in order to 
infl uence the policymaking process. Participating in elec-
toral politics is also regarded as a vehicle for establishing a 
broader base of support for unions. 
   The pattern of industrial confl ict and the transformation 
of unionism in the post-Suharto era may have stimulated a 
growing and more consolidated working-class movement, 
but the gains are never assured (Hadiz, 2001). For ex-
ample, two leaders of a progressive union in the Bekasi 
industrial region, near Jakarta, successfully campaigned 
for local electoral seats in 2014. This was a successful 
experiment since they won through organized support from 
militant members. Following their historic victory, the lead-
ers of the national union took a controversial position in 
the 2014 presidential election – mobilizing union mem-
bers to support the presidential candidate who had served 
in Suharto’s authoritarian regime and who was endorsed 
largely by Islamic political parties lacking political roots in 
the working class. This has raised major questions about 
the interest of the unions’ national leaders in class politics.
   Meanwhile, most of the other union experiments in 
electoral politics have fi zzled out, failing to win signifi cant 
votes even from workers’ communities. Many of those 
who did win electoral seats did not use their own union 
as a political base, benefi tting instead from other party 
political machines. Instead of building a working-class 
politics, these politicians fi nd themselves dealing with the 
pragmatics of money politics and competing with power-
ful religious ideologies. 
   A similar situation is found in efforts to broaden labor’s 
constituency through community-based movements. Al-
though some unions were quite successful in establishing 
wide networks and exchanging social for political support, 
they nevertheless now fi nd it diffi cult to establish a strate-
gic common interest. Each group within the network tends 
to remain dominated by their own narrow horizons; sup-
port is simply exchanged between particular groups, with-
out building a common class interest even among workers. 
Likewise, success in promoting a national social security 
system linking the working class to wider social groups 
cannot be regarded as the triumph of class politics: it re-
fl ects a cross-class citizens’ coalition rather than working-
class interests per se. 
   While there are bright spots, the development of the 
current Indonesian labor movement is handicapped by the 
vulnerability of its social base. Although the young genera-
tion – which makes up most of the workforce and is the 
mainspring behind the current labor movement – never 
lived under the authoritarian regime. Instead, they have 
experienced a long history of depoliticization (Caraway et 
al., 2014). Industrial confl icts, social movements, and the 
collective consciousness constructed through these pro-
cesses, are not suffi cient to forge a sturdy class-based po-
litical movement. Moreover, cross-class interests as well 
as other identities such as ones based on religion are pow-
erful rivals for the allegiance of workers.
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> When Religion 
   Becomes Legal
   Identity 
by Antonius Cahyadi, University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia, member of ISA Research 
Committee on Sociology of Religion (RC22) and ISA Thematic Group on Human Rights and 
Global Justice (TG03)
 A t the end of the Suharto era (1990s), the Indo-nesian public sphere was marked by religious sentiment and racial intolerance. Being non-Muslim or Chinese and, therefore, perceived as 
non-native Indonesian, was hard at that time. These sensi-
tive issues were at play in the 1998 riots which triggered the 
“Reformation” that brought Suharto’s New Order to its end.
   Racial discrimination toward Indonesian-Chinese – stipu-
lated as government policy in 1967 when Suharto started 
ruling Indonesia – was prohibited in 2000 by Abdurrahman 
Wahid, Indonesia’s fourth President. Confucianism, which 
is perceived as the traditional religion of the Indonesian-
Chinese, was recognized as one of the country’s offi cial 
religions in 2006. While racial sentiment has been moder-
ated over the past decade, religious sentiment and preju-
dice persist. The issue is so sensitive that people avoid re-
ligion in rational and critical public discourse. Politics make 
religion untouchable. 
The Indonesian Identity Card which 
includes religious identifi cation.
>>
   Throughout Indonesian history, religion has been used 
in politics, reaching its peak in the bureaucratization of 
religious legal identity in the 1970s. In the Dutch East 
Indies era (from the early nineteenth century until 1942), 
religion, especially Islam, was considered a political 
threat, because it could mobilize civil unrest. The Dutch 
colonial government let “religious Islam” grow, but re-
pressed Islam as a political identity. Similar policies sup-
pressed political activities by local indigenous religious 
groups. Expressions of religion were confi ned to the realm 
of personal affairs. 
 
   Under Japanese colonialism (1942-1945), Islam be-
came a strategy of war. The Japanese mobilized anti-Dutch 
sentiment among Indonesia’s Muslim majority, creating a 
special unit of state administration to control and facili-
tate an Islamic movement; in independent Indonesia, this 
would become the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
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   During Indonesia’s early period of independence (1945-
1959), groups who identifi ed as a part of a broad Islamic 
movement claimed they had contributed to Indonesia’s in-
dependence and argued that Indonesia should become an 
Islamic state. On the other side, secular nationalist groups, 
including both Muslims and non-Muslims, insisted that In-
donesia should be a state for all religions. 
   A compromise between these two groups was enshrined 
in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution (article 29). Indone-
sia was not a secular state, because it was based on the 
belief of an almighty god, but it did not specify any spe-
cifi c religious creed. Moreover the new state guaranteed 
religious freedom. But the compromise also established 
a Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1946, a step designed to 
accommodate Islamic groups. 
   In the era of Sukarno’s “guided democracy,” (1959-
1965) there was polarization between religious groups 
and non-religious groups, with great tension between re-
ligious groups (Muslims and Catholics) on one side and 
communists on the other. Sukarno’s nationalist faction, 
which leaned toward socialism, tended to be more neu-
tral in terms of religion. In order to make religious groups 
feel protected from atheist-communists attacks and to 
win support from religious groups, Sukarno introduced an 
anti-blasphemy law in 1965 concerning the “Prevention of 
Blasphemy and Abuse of Religions.” Later, this unexpected 
law served as a basis for the next phase of Islamization, as 
it was used against people seen as acting against religion 
(especially Islam).
   During the Suharto era (1966-1998), religion became 
excessively bureaucratized. The anti-blasphemy law served 
as the guardian of religion’s position in the public domain. 
Under this law, the Suharto administration recognized 
several offi cial state religions (Islam, Protestant, Roman 
Catholic, Buddhism and Hinduism), excluding Confucian-
ism and local beliefs. 
   Ever since the Suharto era, Indonesian citizens have had 
to declare their religion offi cially on their ID cards. Effec-
tively, the Ministry of Religious Affairs serves as an execu-
tive organ for exercising the governing power of the state. 
In addition, a marriage law that was enacted in 1974 in-
tensifi ed the power of religion in state administration: ad-
hering to one of the country’s offi cial religions is required 
for obtaining marriage and birth certifi cates. Meanwhile, 
the 1989 Religious Court Act established religion’s power 
deep in Indonesia’s administrative structure through the 
judicial branch of government. Religion became a legal 
identity. The Ministry of Religion strengthened the power of 
religion, giving it a bureaucratic basis; it penetrates state 
administration, differentiating between citizens. This is how 
Suharto brought religion under his wing. 
   With the Reformation (following Suharto’s resigna-
tion in 1998), Indonesia’s public sphere became a site 
of contestation for many groups (religious, ethnic, local 
and territorial communities), seeking public attention, and 
recognition from the state. In the Reformation era there 
emerged a new politicized Islamic movement expressed, 
for example, in the religious confl icts that erupted in the 
Moluccas in 1999. This upsurge in religious confl ict led 
to a new tolerance for unrecognized (unoffi cial) religions 
and “other Islamic” (Ahmadiyya and Shia as well as the 
majority Sunni) identities to be represented on the public 
stage. Along with the recognition of Confucianism and lo-
cal beliefs, previously unrecognized religious groups have 
been permitted to register their marriages since 2006. In-
dividuals may now leave “religion” blank on their ID cards, 
even if they do not belong to one of the offi cial religions. 
   However, religion often wins in political contests, sug-
gesting that religious sentiment and ties remain stronger 
than any other socio-cultural affi liation. Religious senti-
ment in Indonesia’s public sphere is not uncomplicated. 
But clearly, when religion becomes a legal identity, religion 
has been regimented as a state instrument, exploited by 
the ruler to oversee the ruled. Through Indonesia’s state 
administrative agencies and its judicial branch, religion’s 
authority has been co-opted by the state, and strengthen-
ing its power over people’s everyday life. In such an organ-
ized form, religion becomes an administrative affair, threat-
ening its spirituality.
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> Stimulating
   Upward 
   Mobility 
by Indera Ratna Irawati Pattinasarany, University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia, 
member of ISA Research Committees on Sociology of Education (RC04) and Social 
Stratifi cation (RC28)
Social stratifi cation in a busy road 
of Jakarta.  I ndonesia experienced tremendous economic recov-ery after the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis, going from a low middle-income country to joining the G-20 group. In addition, Indonesia has attained political, 
fi nancial and economic stability, and become one of the 
world’s largest democracies (World Bank, 2014a). Despite 
impressive growth, inequality is also rising, as evidenced 
in Indonesia’s Gini coeffi cient, which rose from 0.33 in 
1999 to 0.41 in 2011. This increased inequality may lead 
>>
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to slower poverty reduction, decelerated economic growth, 
and increased confl ict and social tension. Moreover, in-
equality both refl ects and creates unfair access to public 
services: a child from the bottom decile of the population 
has a 43% likelihood of being physically stunted, compared 
to only 14% for the top decile. Likewise, the probability of 
dropping out of school is far higher for children from poorer 
homes: 71% of the lowest decile will leave school early, 
compared to 26% from the top (World Bank, 2014b).
   For many years, inequality in Indonesia has been most 
obvious in unequal opportunities for upward social mobil-
ity. Which people are most successful in improving their 
social position, and what factors produce upward social 
mobility? My research examined inequality in the urban 
areas of two provinces, West and East Java, drawing on 
the longitudinal data compiled by the Indonesian Family 
Life Survey (IFLS) 1993-2007. The sample includes 1,177 
men and women aged 20-64. 
   Opportunities for upward social mobility in urban Indo-
nesia are greater for individuals from higher social classes 
than for lower-class Indonesians (Pattinasarany, 2012). 
The data shows around 27% social mobility from lower to 
middle classes compared to 45% from middle to upper 
classes. In fact, opportunities for social mobility barely ex-
ist in the lowest classes. In Indonesia, as in much of the 
world, the lower the social class, the smaller the chance 
for upward mobility. As well as class rigidity, there is also 
positional rigidity, keeping most respondents in the same 
class as their parents. 
   With regard to gender, men are more likely to move up-
ward than similarly-situated women, especially for those 
who start out in the lower social class. The demands on 
women to fulfi l gender roles, in the household as well as 
in professional life, complicate women’s careers, limiting 
their upward mobility. Education clearly infl uences upward 
social mobility in Indonesia. The higher the education level 
the greater the opportunity for upward social mobility. Pa-
ternal social class has the strongest infl uence on respond-
ent’s class, while respondent’s education is the second 
strongest variable. 
   My qualitative research in rural Java supports the results 
of quantitative studies that lower-class individuals fi nd it 
diffi cult to move into the middle or upper classes. Howev-
er, there are some interesting exceptions whereby people 
from lower classes rise to the middle class, even without 
schooling. Here are three examples. 
• Many Indonesians opt to work abroad as migrant work-
ers, mostly as domestic workers (usually women) and fac-
tory or construction workers (mainly men). Decisions to 
work as migrants are mainly driven by the lack of job op-
portunities for less-educated Indonesians. Moreover, mi-
grants may earn more than they could in Indonesia for a 
similar work and many send remittances to relatives living 
in villages. With these remittances families may move into 
a higher social class. 
• Another path is through the inter-generational trans-
mission of special skills. A community in Garut (West 
Java) is famous for producing the best men’s barbers in 
Java. For decades, this skill has been passed on from one 
generation to the next. Most successful professional hair 
clippers temporarily work outside their village in big cities 
such as Jakarta. Through their specifi c skills as barbers, 
many have successfully raised their family’s economic 
and social status.
• Thirdly, entrepreneurship offers an alternative path for 
moving up the social ladder. In most villages there is a 
small number of entrepreneurs who usually start as self-
employed, but later moving on to micro-scale enterprises, 
and some even manage to expand their business into 
neighboring villages. They typically work in small shops, 
restaurants or trade. Depending on the location, some of 
these entrepreneurs may start their business with credit 
from bank or government programs or through corporate 
social responsibility programs. Successful entrepreneurs 
may be able to advance into higher social classes. 
   Further studies to explain and overcome the rigidity of 
Indonesia’s class structure, in particular the lack of upward 
mobility for those at the bottom of the income ladder, are 
ongoing. These studies are expected to open up discus-
sion of potential government and private sector programs 
to mitigate unequal opportunities for social mobility.
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